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TEXT AND CONTEXT: CONTRACT INTERPRETATION AS CONTRACT DESIGN
Ronald J. Gilson,* Charles F. Sabel** & Robert E. Scott***
Abstract
Contract interpretation remains the most important source of commercial litigation and
the most contentious area of contemporary contract doctrine and scholarship. Two polar
positions have competed for dominance in contract interpretation. In a textualist regime,
generalist courts cannot consider context; in a contextualist regime, they must. Underlying this
dispute are contrary assumptions about the prototypical contract each interpretive style
addresses. For modern textualists, contracts are bespoke, between legally sophisticated parties
who embed as much or as little of the contractual context as they wish in an integrated writing,
and prefer to protect their choices against judicial interference by an interpretive regime
including parole evidence and plain meaning rules. For contextualists in contrast, contracts are
between legally unsophisticated parties in two prototypical settings. The first is the mass market,
standardized contract between sophisticated sellers and unsophisticated consumers, who cannot
bargain over contractual terms; the second involves commercial parties doing business in a
deeply nuanced world where formal and informal understandings mix and the meaning of a
particular contract can be illuminated by the parties' course of dealings. For the contextualist,
willfully restricting a court's access to information bearing on the parties' real relationship in
both cases degrades judicial interpretation.
We argue that the narrow focus on which prototype should apply universally has
erroneously framed discussion of the parties’ choices and led to an inconclusive and limited
debate about the role of courts in contract interpretation. The range of options for parties and
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generalist courts is much more diverse and variegated than the choice between ex ante party
autonomy and ex post adjudication. We present a typology of transactional settings—the design
space for contract—sufficiently rich to capture the breath of current contractual experience but
sufficiently parsimonious to clarify the central relationship between the factors that shape the
design of any given contract and the role of courts in interpreting it. We show that design and
judicial response depends, first, on the level of uncertainty and, second, on the thickness of the
market—whether there are many traders or few engaged in a similar class of transactions. The
higher the level of uncertainty, the less workable complete, state-contingent contracts become,
and the more parties develop interpretive mechanisms based on rich and regular exchange of
information on a project’s progress that allows each to gauge the other’s capacity to define and
produce a product. The greater the number of traders engaged in a transaction, the more likely
that the interpretive regime—terms adapted to current need—will be provided by a trade
association or, given collective action problems, a public regulator. The interplay of uncertainty
and scale illuminates new forms of contracting among legally sophisticated parties
unanticipated in discussions of textualist prototypes, and recasts the contextualist prototypes as
special cases that demand novel institutional responses, including generalist courts sufficiently
versed in the parties’ practices that they resemble early courts of equity. More generally, our
analysis reveals a surprising complementarity between public regulation and common law
adjudication in a variety of settings. Contractual interpretation today should attend to today’s
contracts and courts: Our aim is to escape the stalemate between textualists and contextualists
and open the way for doctrine and debate to support the novelty of contemporary contracting
practices.
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INTRODUCTION
Contract interpretation remains the most important source of commercial litigation1 and
the least settled, most contentious area of contemporary contract doctrine and scholarship.2
Framed by the battle between the titans of contract, Samuel Williston and Arthur Corbin, and
continuing to the present, two polar positions have competed for dominance in contract
interpretation. In a textualist regime, generalist courts cannot choose to consider context; in a
contextualist regime, these courts must consider it. Thus, text or context.

1

Judge Richard Posner has estimated that many if not a majority of the contract cases he sees present interpretation
disputes. See, e.g., Richard Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1582
(2005). An early empirical study found that 26% of a sample of five hundred cases raised interpretation and parol
evidence issues. Harold Shepherd, Contracts in a Prosperity Year, 6 STAN. L. REV. 208, 223 (1954); see also David
A. Dilts, Of Words and Contracts: Arbitration and Lexicology, DISP. RESOL. J., May-July 2005, at 41, 43 (“The
construction of contract language is the controversy most evident in contract disputes.”); John P. Tomaszewski, The
Pandora s Box of Cyberspace: State Regulation of Digital Signatures and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 33
GONZ. L. REV. 417, 432 (1997-1998) (“Most contract litigation involves disputes over construction of the terms in a
contract.”).
2

See infra text accompanying notes 3-9 and Part I.A-I.B.
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Underlying this dispute are contrary assumptions about the prototypical contract each
interpretive style addresses. For the 19th century forerunners of the modern textualists, the key
prototype was a contract for commodity futures, a bargained-for, voluntary agreement between
fully informed and competent parties, embodying crossed promises, at least one of which is to be
executed in the future, and establishing the idea of expectation damages derived from plausible
calculations about the gains of a foregone transaction.3 Their 20th century intellectual heirs
broadened the prototypical transaction to included all bespoke or state contingent contracts in
which the parties, aided by counsel, are legally sophisticated; capable of designing ex ante
contracts that will put them in the best available position to respond to whatever eventuates.4
Because they are able to embed as much or as little of the contractual context as they wish in a
written, integrated contract, legally sophisticated parties are more likely to resent than to
welcome a court’s efforts to supplement or circumvent their original design by its own
contextual investigation. Hence, the preference of these sophisticated parties for textualist
interpretation, as embodied in the parol evidence and plain meaning rules and the effect of
integration, anti-waiver and modification clauses.5 These doctrines direct courts to look to a
contract's formal language and disregard claims, unless anchored in the text, that the parties
intended to assign contract terms a special meaning revealed by the course of dealings or other
feature of the context of their relation, or otherwise intended to supplement the formal contract
by unwritten understandings and undertakings.6
3

Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 917, 936 (1974);
Robert E. Scott, The Death of Contract Law, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 369, 371 (2004).

4

Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926, 957–63 (2010).

5

There are good reasons to believe that commercially sophisticated parties prefer a regime that follows the parties’
instructions specifying when to strictly enforce formal contract terms and when to delegate authority to a court to
consider surrounding context evidence. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargains Bicoastal: New Light on Contract Theory,
31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1478 (2010). By eliminating the risk that courts will erroneously infer the parties’
preference for contextual interpretation, such a regime reduces the costs of contract enforcement and enhances the
parties’ control over the content of their contract. That control, in turn, permits sophisticated commercial parties to
implement the most efficient design strategies available to them. Ex post, preferences may change for the party
disfavored by the resolution of uncertainty, who may then prefer the right to persuade a court of a different result. Of
course, that is the point of the ex ante focus. See infra text accompanying notes 45-56.
6

A strong majority of U.S. courts continue to follow the traditional, textualist or “formalist,” approach to contract
interpretation. A state-by-state survey of recent court decisions shows that thirty-eight states follow the textualist
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Contextualist interpretation, in contrast, directs courts to determine whether extrinsic
evidence of the circumstances surrounding the contract or its performance improves
understanding of what parties intended regardless of the contractual text. For contextualists the
prototypical contractual transaction is one in which one or both parties are, or for that contract
choose to be, legally unsophisticated: unable or unwilling to incur the expense to express their
undertakings in contract language, and therefore reliant on the equitable judgments of courts in
case of disputes. Contextualists argue that the court’s untrammeled authority to consider context
is important in two core prototypical settings. The first is the mass market, standardized contract
between sophisticated sellers and unsophisticated consumers, who do not or cannot bargain over
contractual terms. Extending the court's inquiry beyond the contract's four corners is necessary
to prevent such necessarily passive parties from exploitation through adhesion to formal contract
terms that do not reflect their real intentions.7
The second core contextualist prototype involves commercial rather than consumer
contracting. As stressed by Karl Llewellyn and partially reflected in the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.), many commercial parties do business in a deeply nuanced world where formal
and informal understandings mix in a mélange of explicit terms and underlying practice whose
joint application to the particular contract can be illuminated by the parties' course of dealings.8
In this setting parties who are sophisticated about their business choose to be legally
unsophisticated in the sense of avoiding ex ante design: the stakes in any given transaction are
generally insufficient to justify bespoke contracting aided by legal counsel. Instead, the parties
prefer to entrust adjudication, including determination of the details of the contractual context, to
approach to interpretation. Nine states, joined by the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) for sales cases and the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, have adopted a contextualist or anti-formalist interpretive regime. The
remaining states’ doctrines are indeterminate. See U.C.C. §§ 2-202, 2-208, 1-205; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS §§ 200, 209; Robert E. Scott, State-by-State Survey (Oct. 7, 2009) (on file).
7

Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968).

8

See e.g., U.C.C.§§2-202(a) cmt. 1(b), 2; 1-303 cmt. 1 (“The meaning of the agreement of the parties is to be
determined by the language used by them and by their action, read and interpreted in the light of commercial
practices and other surrounding circumstances. The measure and background for interpretation are set by the
commercial context, which may explain and supplement even the language of a formal or final writing.”).
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generalist courts. For the contextualist, willfully restricting a court's access to the trove of
information bearing on the parties' real relationship degrades judicial interpretation and frustrates
these parties’ efforts to govern their transactions efficiently.9
And so the debate has continued: Either the parties are empowered to write their
contracts to create desired incentives and predictable results without courts later assessing
whether the words mean what they say at the instance of a disappointed party, or the courts are
presumed to have been delegated the task of assessing the parties' real intentions in light of
relevant facts that are not in the contract’s text. Viewed in this way, the debate is not about the
stark choice between text or context but rather about who decides the appropriate mix of text and
context to use in resolving a dispute over the meaning of the parties contractual rights and
obligations. The problem, however, is that the artificially narrow focus over which of these class
prototypes should apply universally has erroneously framed the choice of the best decision
maker as either the parties themselves exercising their freedom to contract as they please or a
common law court protecting vulnerable parties from erroneously imposed contractual
obligations. This is a false choice and thus the debate is inconclusive. In fact, the range of
options for allocating decision rights in the world inhabited both by parties designing their
contracts and generalist courts interpreting them are much more diverse and variegated—more
highly contextualized as it were—than the assumption that the law must choose between ex ante
party autonomy and ex post adjudication. Properly conceived, the mix of text and context in the
particular case is best chosen by a wide range of interpretive regimes (both public and private)10
that function as complements to common law adjudication rather than as antagonists.
9

For a sampling of the scholarship supporting this view, see generally, MELVIN A. EISENBERG, FOUNDATIONAL
PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW (2014); STEVEN J. BURTON, ELEMENTS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION (OXFORD
2009); Shawn J. Bayern, Rational Ignorance, Rational Closed-Mindedness, and Modern Economic Formalism in
Contract Law, 97 CAL. L. REV. 943 (2009); James W. Bowers, Murphy s Law and the Elementary Theory of
Contract Interpretation: A Response to Schwartz and Scott, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 587 (2005); Steven J. Burton, A

Lesson on Some Limits of Economic Analysis: Schwartz and Scott on Contract Interpretation, 88 IND. L.J.
329 (2013); and Juliet P. Kostritsky, Plain Meaning vs. Broad Interpretation: How the Risk of Opportunism
Defeats a Unitary Default Rule for Interpretation, 96 KY. L.J. 43 (2007-08).
10

We use the term “interpretive regimes” to refer to the full range of non-adjudicatory systems that regulate the mix
of text and context that will govern any particular interpretive dispute. These range from private interpretive
structures among individual contracting parties, to collective bodies such as trade associations, to public agencies
such as the Federal Trade Commission and, in some circumstances, to general purpose courts.

6

Our goal in this Article therefore is to shift the focus of discussion from the potential
generalizability of (competing) contractual prototypes to a discussion of what we call the design
space for contracting: various features in the transactional setting that dispose contracting parties
to choose a particular regime and a complementary form of adjudication to govern their relation,
rather than another. More precisely, we present a typology of these relations sufficiently rich to
capture the breath of current contractual experience but sufficiently parsimonious to serve as the
basis for an understanding of the central relationship between the factors that shape the design of
any given contract and the role of courts in interpreting that design.
The starting point of our analysis is the recognition that how contracting parties deal with
interpretation issues in designing their contracts, and how courts optimally respond to the parties’
efforts, depends on two critical characteristics of the particular contracting environment. The
first is the level of uncertainty11—whether commercial practices are stable and predictable, or
disrupted by unforeseeable changes in technical possibilities and market conditions. The second
is the scope or thickness of the market—whether there are many traders or few engaged in a
particular class of transaction using similar contracting strategies.12 All else equal, the higher the
level of uncertainty, the more difficult it is for parties to write, and courts to interpret complete,
state-contingent contracts. Rather, when the level of uncertainty is high, collaborating parties
11

It is commonplace to follow Frank Knight and distinguish between risk—the likelihood of an event that can be
estimated probabilistically—and uncertainty—the likelihood of whose occurrence, or even whether it could happen
at all, is unknown. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19-20 (1921). See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles
F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 431, 433 (2009). For a helpful discussion of how the incomplete foresight associated with
Knightian uncertainty is central to institutional (contractual) design, see Rudolph Richter, Efficiency of Institutions:
From the Perspective of New Institutional Economics with Emphasis on Knightian Uncertainty 16–20 (July 13,
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2105604. Any particular transaction will
present elements of both risk and uncertainty but in different proportions. For expositional purposes, we will treat
the term “low-uncertainty” as covering situations in which probabilistic assessments can be made in important
respects, and we will use the term “high-uncertainty” for circumstances where probabilistic assessments are of little
consequence. Thus, a high level of uncertainty exists when exogenous events that may affect the parties’ obligations
to perform are unknown or cannot be estimated probabilistically. Conditions of high uncertainty—generally the
product of an exogenous shock—can occur in either bilateral or multilateral markets. Similarly, under conditions of
low uncertainty, both bespoke and multilateral contractors can identify relevant risks that may impede future
performance, estimate their occurrence probabilistically, and allocate those risks in the resulting agreement.
12

A thick market is one in which many commercial actors are exchanging goods or services by using the same or
similar contracting behaviors and strategies. Hence the contracting is multilateral.

7

develop interpretive mechanisms based on rich and regular exchange of information on a
project’s progress that allows each to ascertain the other’s capacity jointly to define and produce
a product. All else equal, the greater the number of traders engaged in a transaction, the more
likely that the interpretive regime—terms adapted to current need and a mechanism for adjusting
terms as needs change—will be provided by a collective entity, such as a trade association, that
can provide to a court the necessary context for interpretation.13
The interplay of these two forces —uncertainty and scale—draws attention to new forms of
contracting among legally sophisticated parties unanticipated in earlier discussions of textualist
prototypes, and helps clarify the (often overwhelming) institutional demands that contextualist
prototypes place on generalist courts. Most of the commercial contracting practices that have
evolved in response to varying levels of uncertainty and scale do not map onto any of the
traditional prototypes that have been the foundation of the current disputes between textualists
and contextualists.14 Thus, for example, the design of sophisticated information exchange
regimes to cope with high levels of uncertainty, where parties explore the capacities of their
counterparts and the viability of joint projects, in effect abandons the probabilistic world at the
foundation of the executory contract and its regime of expectation damages: Here collaboration
becomes the precondition for determining the probabilities of success, and for the this reason
expectation of future gain cannot be the measure of breaches of the obligation to collaborate.15
The design space for contracting marked out by increasing levels of uncertainty and
market thickness highlights new forms of legally sophisticated contracting, but it also recasts the
contextualist prototypes as special cases that demand novel institutional responses. Placed in our
13

In previous work, we have assessed how uncertainty and scale shape how contracting parties deal with a particular
manifestation of uncertainty: the design of innovative contracts that respond to changes in the economic
environment by changing existing practices to respond to the new circumstances and then stabilize these new
arrangements through a variety of institutions. See Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contract
and Innovation, The Limited Role of Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel Contractual Forms, 88 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 170 (2013). Here we generalize the central role of uncertainty and market scale to interpretive issues more
broadly.
14

For a discussion of those prototypes and their respective normative claims, see infra text accompanying notes 3756.
15

See infra text accompanying notes 132-137.
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typology, mass-market contracts with consumers—one of the two traditional prototypes
involving legally unsophisticated parties—stands as a special case of contracting in thick markets
under low uncertainty: While large and well-endowed sellers either have no need to cooperate
with others or can collude with their peers when they do, consumers are fragmented and
infrequent buyers of many goods, and must resolve nearly insurmountable collective action
problems to secure economies of scale in contracting. Whatever protection the state wishes to
provide these isolated and legally unsophisticated parties must occur, therefore, at the initial
stage in the form of interpretive limits on the design of consumer contracts. The lessons of scale
that have motivated commercial parties to create specialized interpretive regimes argue for a
similar response to the regulation of consumer contracts: agencies and courts working in tandem
can best assess the fairness and efficiency of non-negotiated contract terms.16
Similarly, the second prototype of legally unsophisticated parties—smaller firms such as
machine shops supplying numerous firms in various industries with parts produced using the
same set of flexible machines—is in our typology a special case that straddles two categories. On
the one hand these sellers engage in repeated dealings in fairly thick markets: the parts are made
by the same processes, often to similar tolerances, even if the uses vary greatly. But transactions
of the same type with the same kind of party are too infrequent and irregular as to warrant
investments in creating and updating an industry-wide code with precise contract terms. On the
other hand, no single transaction or set of transactions with a single buyer is large enough to
warrant investment in legal sophistication and an elaborate, bespoke contract. Hence, legally
unsophisticated commercial parties in this betwixt and between situation use standard-form
documents; they typically elect to leave their agreements un-integrated and to ignore conflicts
between forms proffered by each.17 The result is an interpretive default that delegates to courts
the decision on how best to flesh out unwritten understandings on a case-by-case basis.

16

In consumer law the European Union presents the most prominent example of this type of regime. A series of
directives—framework legislation that must be transposed in national law by member states—cabin consumer
contracts from commercial transactions and blacklist practices regarded as intrinsically unfair to the less
sophisticated party. See infra text accompanying notes 159-175.
17

See infra text accompanying notes 198-208.
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But there is virtually no evidence that courts, even those operating under U.C.C.’s
invitation to broadly examine context, actually undertake such empirical investigations, and
hence little reason to imagine they could succeed if they did.18 Long-term, reciprocal relations
always reflect the idiosyncrasies of the histories of each party with the others; and these
idiosyncrasies prevent the community’s practice from settling into a determinate rule.19 Thus,
even if generalist courts were better equipped for empirical investigation than they normally are,
there will typically be no custom-based, context embedded, rule for them to discover.20
Nonetheless, under certain circumstances—most often when judges and parties share a common
background, and meet in the resolution of broadly similar cases over many years—courts
historically, and in special cases today, have developed expertise in particular domains of
commerce, and by entering the parties’ epistemic community can create an interpretive regime
that effectively accommodates ex post review of their practices.21
The only one of the traditional prototypes that does, in contrast, fit securely in our
typology concerns commercial transactions in thin markets at medium levels of uncertainty. In
this case, legally sophisticated parties act in conformity with textualist expectations: they specify
ex ante, in bespoke contracts, the mix of text and context a generalist court should apply in its
after-the-fact determination of their respective obligations, and they rely on adherence to their

18

In fact, recent research on the medieval law merchant, the formation of rules regarding commodity exchanges in
early 20th century trade associations and the current practices of a closed community of cattle-feed traders strongly
suggest that on-going, “traditional” dealings never crystalize into well defined, customary rules at all. Emily Kadens,
The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1153, 1176-77 (2012); Lisa Bernstein, Trade Usage in
the Courts: The Flawed Evidentiary Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy 20–21 (2012) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file) [hereinafter Bernstein, Trade Usage in the Courts] (empirical evidence showing courts
typically rely on unreliable evidence to establish usages); Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Modern Economy 1112 (U. Chi., Working Paper No. 639, 2013). This evidence suggests that many courts, lacking expertise, fall back
instead on interested party testimony and generic concepts of reasonable commercial behavior rather than a careful
evaluation of complex evidentiary submissions. The lack of any systematic inquiry into actual practices may also
reflect the fact that any context evidence that is introduced must be evaluated in an environment of extreme moral
hazard where one party who is disappointed by fate seeks to persuade the court to shift the relevant risk to the
counterparty. See infra text accompanying notes 128 -131.
19

See PIERRE BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE (R. Nice trans., 1977).

20

Richard Craswell, Do Trade Customs Exist?, in THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 118148 (J.S. Kraus & S.D. Walt eds., 2000).
21

See infra Part IV.B.
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instructions.22 But increase the level of uncertainty and the contract becomes an interpretive
framework that limits the court to sanctioning defections from broad, mutual commitments to
collaborate.23 Decrease, perhaps only slightly the level of uncertainty, and increase the number of
transactors and the contract becomes a collection of precise terms, defined and frequently
updated by a trade association, and disputes arising under it are likely to be resolved by a
specialized, arbitral body.24
More generally, our typology of the different interpretive regimes that choose between
text and context not only strips the traditional contractual prototypes of general significance, but
shows that generalist courts are, and under current conditions should be, less central to
adjudication of contract disputes than assumed by both sides in the on-going debate. Our
analysis strongly suggests that courts need to acknowledge in doctrine, and contract scholars
must acknowledge in theory, what commercial parties have long recognized in practice:
generalist judges applying general, mandatory legal doctrine cannot effectively determine the
environments in which context matters.25 The evolution of the history of contract doctrine shows
that the common law has lost the general capacity to successfully combine text and context
through the adjudicatory process as a substitute for a regime of contract design.26 In contrast to
early courts of equity, when the courts were close to the actors in a largely homogenous
economy, generalist courts today are removed from the enormously varied commercial
contracting context in modern economics and therefore critically impaired in their ability to
divine how and when parties would braid both text and context in their contracts. Given the
variety of their situations, the limits of the generalist judiciary and the doctrinal logjam courts
have created, it is perhaps unsurprising that sophisticated commercial parties turn to specialized

22

See infra Part III.B.2.

23

See infra Part II.B.4.

24

See infra Part III.C.1.

25

See generally Bernstein, Trade Usage in the Courts, supra note 18; Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Modern
Economy, supra note 18, at 11-12.

26

See infra Part II.

11

interpretive regimes to accommodate text and context and to resolve their disputes reliably, at
acceptable cost.27
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I we survey in more detail the existing landscape
of contract interpretation doctrine and scholarship. Here we show how and why the current
debate came to be framed as a contest among proponents of contrasting contractual prototypes,
each represented as of nearly universal significance. We argue that the focus on the traditional
text versus context prototypes masks the way that differences in levels of uncertainty and scale
shape contemporary contracting practices.
Part II addresses history, to show that in pre-industrial England generalist courts, in
contrast to today, were capable of supporting the two contract functions at odds in current
doctrinal disputes—adhering to ex ante rules and updating those rules over time by combining
text with context—especially when the two functions were divided between law and equity.
With the merger of law and equity and the embodiment of the merged doctrine in the prototype
of the executory contract, the difficulty of such “unified” and universally applicable modes of
interpretation became apparent.
In Part III we focus on the critical roles of uncertainty and scale in determining how
legally sophisticated parties, both individually and collectively, create interpretive regimes that
determine the mix of text and context in commercial contracting. Here we generally endorse the
textualist claim that these commercial parties are better able than generalist courts to decide how
best to take context into account in different environments, but qualify that assertion by
specifying the various situations in which the resulting interpretive arrangement deviates from
the classical image of the bargained-for, state-contingent contract.
Finally, in Part IV we focus on the unique issues raised when legally unsophisticated
parties contract. With respect to consumer transactions, we address the analytic and policy
confusion that has resulted from courts deploying general contract principles to address the
problems of consumer protection. We argue that deterring rent seeking and exploitation requires
27

See generally Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 11.
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a interpretive regime such as that in the European Union (EU) that authorizes protection of
certain interests in particular domains, and prohibits practices antithetic to those interests and an
orderly market generally. With respect to legally unsophisticated commercial parties, we then
show that the core problem is the assumption that generalist courts are capable of both divining
underlying custom and practice and applying that knowledge to the case at hand. We argue that
the institutional knowledge that developed in traditional courts of equity can be replicated if
courts can acquire an expertise in the relevant transactional prototypes. However, legally
unsophisticated commercial parties who rely on generalist courts to unpack context are subject to
a measurably higher risk of judicial error: these parties inevitably trade off lower front end
contracting costs for higher enforcement costs on the back end.

I.

REFRAMING THE DIVIDE BETWEEN TEXT AND CONTEXT IN CONTRACT
INTERPRETATION

A. The Contrasting Purposes of Contract Interpretation: Ex Ante Contract Design
Versus Ex Post Adjudication28
As we noted above, interpretation disputes are the largest single source of commercial
contract litigation. But despite the importance of having consistent, predictable and efficient
rules of interpretation, how to interpret contracts is the least settled question in contemporary
contract doctrine and scholarship. This is in large part because modern contract law is assumed
to be unitary—that is, a single set of legal rules and governing policies presumably applies to all
agreements regardless of the status of the contracting parties. Thus, debate continues, fruitlessly,
about the respective advantages and disadvantages of textualist and contextualist theories of
interpretation, while the larger issues of who can best decide when and to what extent context
should supplement text in interpreting a particular contract, and hence how and by whom
interpretive regimes should be designed, are ignored.

28

The discussion in this Part draws on Robert E. Scott, The Failure of a Unitary Law of Contract Interpretation, in
THE AMERICAN ILLNESS: ESSAYS ON THE RULE OF LAW (Yale U.P. 2014).
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Textualist theories undergird the formal common law doctrines of contract interpretation,
such as the parol evidence and plain meaning rules. Both doctrines are designed to give parties
some control over the process courts will use to interpret their contracts; in effect, the parties are
given leeway to design their contract by specifying whether and to what extent a court will
consider evidence contrary to the contract’s language.29 This interpretive approach, followed by
a substantial majority of common law courts,30 privileges integrated contracts over context
evidence that arguably suggests the agreement contained additional or different terms or
meanings. Textualist jurisdictions, such as New York, use a “hard” parol evidence rule that
gives presumptively conclusive effect to merger or integration clauses, and, in their absence,
presume that the contract is fully integrated if it appears final and complete on its face.31 In the
same spirit, the textualist approach bars context evidence suggesting that parties intended to
impart non-standard meaning to language that, read alone, is unambiguous.32 From the textualist
29

The parol evidence rule enables parties to control the admissibility of certain kinds of evidence in any future
adjudication of disputes over their agreement: When parties choose to fully integrate or commit to writing the
entirety of an agreement (and declare that they have done so in a merger or integration clause), they forfeit the right
in subsequent litigation to prove understandings they declined to include in their integrated writing or that, they
claim, emerged in the course of performance of the agreement. The common law thus treats the decision to integrate
an agreement as a matter of party discretion. Similarly, the best understanding of the plain meaning rule treats it as a
device for preserving a reservoir of terms with clear meanings that cannot be contradicted in adjudication by
contextual evidence supporting a different meaning. On this account, the plain meaning rule makes available a
public fund of terms with judicially protected meanings on which contractual parties can rely to effectively
communicate their commitments to each other and to courts. Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and
the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1023, 1046 (2009).
30

A large majority of U.S. courts continue to follow the traditional, textualist approach to contract interpretation.
See supra note 6.
31

See, e.g., Morgan Stanley High Yield Sec., Inc. v. Seven Circle Gaming Corp., 269 F. Supp. 2d 206, 213-15
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that the prior agreement is excluded where the writing appears in view of thoroughness
and specificity to embody a final agreement); Intershoe, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 571 N.E.2d 641, 644 (N.Y. 1991)
(same); Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646, 646-48 (N.Y. 1928) (upholding the ”four corners “presumption and
excluding evidence of collateral agreement to land sale contract). In addition, merger clauses are given virtually
conclusive effect in New York. See Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 21 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Ordinarily,
a merger clause provision indicates that the subject agreement is completely integrated, and parol evidence is
precluded from altering or interpreting the agreement.”); Norman Bobrow & Co. v. Loft Realty Co., 577 N.Y.S.2d
36, 36 (App. Div. 1991) (“Parol evidence is not admissible to vary the terms of a written contract containing a
merger clause.”).

32

The plain meaning rule addresses the question of what legal meaning should be attributed to the contract terms
that the parol evidence rule has identified. Contests over the meaning of contract terms follow a predictable pattern:
one party claims that the words in a disputed term should be given their “plain” or standard dictionary meaning as
read in light of the contract as a whole and the pleadings. The counterparty argues either that the contract term in
question is ambiguous and extrinsic evidence will resolve the ambiguity, or that extrinsic evidence will show that
the parties intended the words to be given a specialized or idiosyncratic meaning that varies from the meaning in the

14

perspective, therefore, the parol evidence and plain meaning rules are tools with which the
contracting parties can control the evidence courts will use to interpret the portion of their
agreement that they intend to make legally enforceable.
This straightforward account of the textualist interpretation doctrine as tools for contract
design used by autonomous parties entering into voluntary, bargained-for agreements is
relatively uncontroversial. But courts sometimes face a dilemma: maintain fidelity to the
language and purpose of the various textualist doctrines even when the outcome apparently
thwarts the parties’ intentions as understood ex post, or maintain fidelity to the parties’ apparent
intentions even though this requires the consideration of contextual evidence that textualist
interpretation otherwise would exclude.
Contextualist courts resolve this dilemma by deploying their equitable powers to avoid
the application of formal contract doctrine that yields an apparently unfair or erroneous result.
Thus, in jurisdictions following the lead of the Second Restatement of Contracts33 and in all
contracts governed by the U.C.C.,34 contextualist theories advocate a two-stage interpretive
regime. Under this regime, interpretive doctrines such as the parol evidence rule are treated
merely as prima facie guidance, which courts can (and should) override by considering
additional evidence of the context of the transaction if they believe that doing so is necessary to
substantially “correct” or complete the parties’ written contract by realigning it with its “true”
meaning. This ex post judicial determination of the contractual obligation serves as a fallback
mechanism whenever a court determines that interpreting contract terms according to the parties’
apparent written instructions will fail to achieve the parties’ purposes. In short, under the
contextualist view every contract comes with a judicial insurance policy permitting the
standard language. As with the division over hard and soft parol evidence rules, courts have divided on the question
whether express contract terms should be given a contextual or a plain meaning interpretation. Under the latter
practice, when words or phrases appear to be unambiguous, extrinsic evidence of a possible contrary meaning is
inadmissible. For discussion, see Schwartz & Scott, supra note 4.
33

See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§210 cmt. b; 212 cmt b; 214 (1979).

34

Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, adopted in all states except Louisiana, governs all “transactions in
goods.” U.C.C. § 2-102. The contextualist rules of interpretation are found in §2-202 cmt.1(b), 2; §1-303 cmt. 1.
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replacement or enrichment of contract terms that, viewed in what the court believes to be the
proper context, have ill-served the parties’ intentions.35
Contextualists argue, therefore, that formal interpretive rules that exclude certain
categories of extrinsic evidence deprive the fact finder of indispensible information relevant to
deciding the case and thus can distort the court’s assessment of what the parties meant by their
agreement. Contextualist jurisdictions, such as California, carry this view to its logical limit and
reject the notion that words in a contract can have a plain or unambiguous—context free—
meaning at all. By the same logic they favor a soft parol evidence rule. Here the test for
integration admits extrinsic evidence notwithstanding an unambiguous merger clause declaring
the contract to be an integrated writing or, absent such a clause, notwithstanding the fact that the
writing appears final and complete on its face.36 Courts in these jurisdictions regard the merger
clause as merely creating a rebuttable presumption of integration that can be overridden by
extrinsic evidence that the parties lacked any such intent.
The debate between contextualism and textualism is intense precisely because there is a
normative justification for each of the traditional prototypes that have been used as exemplars for
each approach. In Part I.B, we set out the foil for our argument by describing these distinct
justifications. Part I.C then argues that the prototypical contractual transactions that drive the
debate obscure the diversity of circumstances that contracting parties confront in practice: By
focusing on these different circumstances we can see how the key factors that influence contract
design shape the interpretive regimes that integrate both text and context.
35

Kraus & Scott, supra note 29, at 1025.

36

Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 645 (Cal. 1968) (“[R]ational
interpretation requires at least a preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered to proved the
intention of the parties.”); Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968) (admitting parol evidence to vary
terms of deed on ground that “evidence of oral collateral agreements should be excluded only when the fact
finder is likely to be misled”). See also Int’l Milling co. v. Hachmeister, Inc., 110 A. 2d 186, 190, 192 (Pa.
1955) (extrinsic evidence of negotiations and antecedent agreements admissible to show buyer had not
assented to the contract as a complete integration of the contract despite the presence of an express merger
clause); 3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 578 (1960) (“The fact that a written document contains one of these express
provisions does not prove that the document itself was ever assented to or ever became operative as a contract.
Neither does it exclude evidence that the document was not in fact assented to and therefore never became
operative.”).
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B. Dueling Justifications
1. The Justification for Contextualism
Under autonomy theories of contract, the parties’ agreement has normative force because
the parties actually agreed to it.37 Thus, the law’s task is to enforce the parties’ will—their
freedom to contract—the better to permit realization of their goals. These theories of contract
require courts to find out, as far as is possible, what the parties meant by the words they used.38
A contextualist approach to interpretation appears to follow logically from this freedom of
contract premise: it invites courts first to learn about the commercial context and then to interpret
express contract terms in light of that context. Implicit in a contextual approach are two key
assumptions: 1) that courts have the capability of learning about the commercial context, and 2)
that the parties could have and would have completed the contract as the court has done had they
been able to do so costlessly.
These two contextualist assumptions derive from quite separate concerns about textualist
rules of interpretation. The assumption that courts can accurately recover the context undergirds
the “incorporation” approach to standard commercial sales contracts championed by Karl
Llewellyn and enshrined in Article 2 of the U.C.C.39 A separate concern about the risk of fraud
37

Most autonomy-based theories are premised either on a notion of consent or the exercise of will, such as the
making of a promise. For discussion, see ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY
23-26 (5th ed. 2013); CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE (1981); Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract
Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL THEORY ch. 18 (Jules L. Coleman & Scott
Shapiro eds., 2002).
38

It is universally understood that a court’s role in interpreting a contract is to determine the intentions of the
parties. Intent, in turn is determined objectively and prospectively. See Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank, 200 F.
287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911, Hand, J.). In other words, a court is directed to recover the parties’ objectively
manifested intentions concerning both the objectives or “ends” of their agreement and the “means” they may
have chosen to determine those ends should they later dispute the meaning of the agreement.
39

As noted in text, Llewellyn believed that the law should identify and incorporate the “working rules” or
governing norms already being used successfully by the parties themselves. Legal incorporation was necessary
in order to tailor the rules to particular practices and trade usages. This notion of incorporation of custom and
practice is deeply imbedded in the Code. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-303. Comment 3 provides that “[Usages and
customs] furnish the background and give particular meaning to the language used [in the contract] and are the
framework of common understanding controlling any general rules of law which hold only when there is no
such understanding.” In this way, Llewellyn’s Article 2 explicitly invites incorporation. The invitation to
contextualize the contract in this manner was explicitly embodied in the Code’s definition of “agreement” as
“the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances
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and exploitation in transactions with unsophisticated parties animates the second.40 Contextualist
interpretations are often justified as necessary to prevent the exploitation of legally
unsophisticated individuals who enter into written contracts with sophisticated parties who
supply written contract terms that alter previously settled understandings. As Justice Traynor
famously wrote: “The party urging the spoken as against the written word is most often the
economic underdog, threatened by severe hardship if the writing is enforced.”41 By examining
the context ex post, courts presumably are able to monitor the process by which certain terms
were reduced to writing, thereby protecting unsophisticated parties from difficult-to-detect forms
of exploitation.
In sum, the contextualist approach focuses on contracts between legally unsophisticated
parties who enter mass-market, standardized transactions with sophisticated merchants (the
consumer context) or commercial contracts embedded in customary norms and terms of trade
among legally unsophisticated businessmen (the sales context). Both of these prototypes
contradict the textualist presumption of the general availability of bespoke contracts for at least
one party in the transactional settings to which they refer. Rather, the contextualist regime rests
on the powerful intuition that fair and efficient contracting takes place in a social context, and
that parties (and society) would prefer courts to take advantage of hindsight in bringing that
context into view in a way that supports the realization of their (legitimate) contractual
objectives. In this view, it seems perverse for a court to hold parties to the apparent plain
meaning of terms knowing that those parties themselves would have rejected that meaning had
they upon formation of the contract known what the court now knows. Holding parties to their
formally specified contract terms when those terms no longer (or never did) reflect their shared
intent exalts formal doctrine over substance.
Despite the fact that common law courts traditionally have followed a textualist
approach, the U.C.C. and the Second Restatement continue to encourage courts to be
including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance . . . .” § 1-201(3). For discussion, see
Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1009 (2002).
40

See supra note 7 and accompanying text.

41

Masterson, 436 P.2d at 564.
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contextual.42 Conventional scholarly wisdom has long held that this interpretive approach
represents a significant improvement over the formalism of the common law.43 This is because
contextualism is assumed to ascertain the parties’ intentions more accurately. More evidence
usually is better than less. Particular parties may have intended apparently clear language to be
read in a nonstandard way, or acted under the contract in ways neither explicitly directed nor
prohibited given the contractual language. Excluding evidence of these parties’ prior
negotiations or subsequent practices risks interpreting their contracts in opposition to the parties’
actual intentions.44
2. The Justification for Textualism
As compelling as it seems, however, the contextualist justification of a two-stage regime
of contract interpretation rests on an unsupported central premise: that litigating parties generally
want a court to reinterpret the formal terms of their contract in light of the surrounding context of
the transaction so as to better achieve their shared contractual purposes. But there is good reason
to doubt that legally sophisticated parties typically, let alone always, prefer this method of
interpreting their contracts. Rather than a rule that always subordinates formal contract terms to
ex post judicial revision, both theory and available evidence suggests that legally sophisticated
parties prefer a regime that follows the parties’ instructions specifying when to enforce formal
contract terms strictly and when to delegate authority to a court to consider surrounding context
evidence.45
42

See U.C.C. §§ 1-205, 2-202 and comments. For discussion, see Robert E. Scott, The Uniformity Norm in
Commercial Law: A Comparative Analysis of Common Law and Code Methodologies, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 149-92 (J. S. Kraus & S. D. Walt, eds., 2000).
43

See, e.g., JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS (6th ed. 2009); sources cited supra note
37.
44

Of course, the reverse could be true. The Code directs courts to construe express terms and extrinsic evidence
from practices or usages as consistent with each other. But sometimes the parties may actually have intended that
their clear language should be read in the standard (plain meaning) way despite the fact that the language itself
conflicts with the prior practices and negotiations of the parties. In such a case, a court that relies heavily on context
risks misinterpreting the parties’ actual intentions.
45

There is empirical evidence that most commercial parties prefer the freedom to choose how and when to delegate
discretion to courts to interpret commercial contracts. See Miller, supra note 5, at 1478 (concluding that “New
York’s formalistic rules win out over California’s contextualist approach. As predicted by theory, sophisticated
parties prefer formalistic rules of contract law.”).
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Textualist arguments accordingly focus on the insight that, for legally sophisticated
parties who write bespoke contracts, context is endogenous; the parties can embed as much or as
little context into a customized agreement as they wish and they can do so in many different
ways.46 By eliminating the risk that courts will erroneously infer the parties’ preference for any
particular contextual interpretation, such a regime reduces the costs of contract enforcement and
enhances these parties’ control over the content of their contract. That control, in turn, permits
legally sophisticated commercial parties to economize on the costs of contracting.
Textualists offer several justifications to support their claims. First, a valuable state
function is to create standard vocabularies for the conduct of commercial transactions.47 When a
phrase has a set, easily discoverable meaning, parties who use it will know what the phrase
requires of them and what courts will say the phrase requires. By insulating the standard
meaning of terms from deviant interpretations, this strategy preserves a valuable collective good,
namely a set of terms with clear, unambiguous meanings that is already understood by the vast
majority of commercial parties.48
Second, a textualist theory of interpretation also creates an incentive to draft carefully.
Under a contextualist theory, a party for whom a deal has turned out badly has an incentive to
46

See supra text accompanying note 22.

47

See Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847, 853-856
(2000); Scott, supra note 42, at 157-158; Alan Schwartz, Contract Theory and Theories of Contract
Regulation, 92 REVUE D’ECONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE 101, 102-03 (2000).
48

Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice; An Analysis of the Interactions Between
Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 286-88 (1985).What does it mean, then, to interpret
contracts according to their “plain meaning”? Proponents of a contextual approach to interpretation have argued
that meaning is necessarily contextual. To be sure, at one level, the debate over plain meaning raises deep
philosophical questions about the nature and knowledge of meaning. In its purely philosophical form, the debate
turns on whether any terms have on their face a unique, acontextual plain meaning. But in commercial litigation the
pressing question is not this deep philosophical one, but whether courts should seek to vindicate the meaning the
parties actually intended or instead to assign terms a more objective meaning. Even if terms do not, strictly
speaking, have a unique, plain meaning, the meanings any terms can be given range along a continuum from purely
subjective to largely objective. Thus, while parties might attach purely subjective meanings to ordinary words, this
does not demonstrate that the same terms do not admit of relatively more objective meanings. For discussion, see
SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 37, at 539-42.
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claim that the parties meant their contract to have a different meaning than the obvious or
standard one. Such a party can often find in the parties’ negotiations, in their past practices and
in trade customs enough evidence to ground a full, costly trial, and thus to force a settlement on
terms more favorable than those that the contract, as facially interpreted, would direct.49
Moreover, this burden of careful drafting does not give untrammeled freedom to parties relying
on the written document to exploit mistakes or misunderstandings. Importantly, the textualist
interpretive doctrines are not self-executing. They do permit a court (within bounds) to exercise
discretion in finding evidence of fraud, mutual mistake or ambiguity in the formulation of key
terms 50 or even the absence of contractual obligation altogether.51
Finally, textualist interpretation permits legally sophisticated commercial parties to
economize on contracting costs by shifting costs from the back end of the contracting process
(the enforcement function) where a court would inquire broadly into context, to the front end of
the contracting process (the negotiating and design function) where the parties specify the extent
to which context will count.52 Parties can do this, for example, by drafting a merger clause that
integrates their entire understanding, including relevant context, into the written contract and
then having the court apply a plain meaning interpretation to those contract terms that are
facially unambiguous. Importantly, when parties fully integrate the agreement and use a merger
clause, an interpretation dispute over contract terms may be resolved on summary judgment,

49

If a party can impeach careful contract drafting with evidence of this type, the rewards to careful contract drafting
will fall relative to the costs of such efforts. In consequence, parties will write precise, directive contracts less
frequently and the expected costs of litigation initiated by the party disfavored by the ultimate outcome of the
contract will rise, encouraged by the chance that the court will make a mistake. Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott,
Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 584-590 (2003).
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For discussion, see SCOTT & KRAUS, supra note 37, at 420-37, 539-41, 691-93.
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See Hewlett Packard Corp. v. Oracle Corp., No. 1-11-CV-203163, 2012 WL 7991733, at 27, 32 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Aug. 29, 2012) (after considering context evidence, court rejects Oracle’s claim of no contract and holds Oracle to
plain language of the agreement).
52

For a discussion of how contracting parties can economize on total contracting costs by shifting costs
between the drafting or front end of the contracting process and the adjudication or back end of the process, see
generally Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814
(2006).
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thereby substantially reducing ex post enforcement costs.53 The reduction in the chance of an
expensive trial, in turn, reduces the settlement value of a claim, and therefore the incentive for a
disappointed party to pursue opportunistic litigation in the first place.

If instead a court decides to consider additional context evidence, it must necessarily
deny a motion for summary judgment and set the case for full trial on the merits. Thus, if
litigation cost is considered, there is a strong argument that in cases where uncertainty is low and
risks can be allocated in advance, many legally sophisticated commercial parties prefer textualist
interpretation so that disputes can be resolved without the punishing costs of a full trial and the
skewed incentives that derive from the anticipation of these costs.54 Such parties will rationally
invest in sufficient drafting costs to insure that a court interpreting the written document together
with the pleadings and briefs will be able to arrive at the “correct interpretation” more often than
not.55 Here the simple comparison is between the costs of drafting and the costs of a trial.

This description of the two approaches and their key assumptions exposes a deep puzzle:
Since the two competing approaches to interpretation are supported by quite different contractual
prototypes, why do they engage in debate at all, much less struggle for supremacy? The answer
lies in their shared presumption of the unitary nature of contract law and the mandatory nature of
interpretation doctrine. For both sides in the interpretation debate, when a court (or legislature)
chooses either a textualist or a contextualist approach to interpretation, that choice applies to all
transactional prototypes, and particular parties cannot choose ex ante to have their particular
53

Schwartz & Scott, supra note 4, at 944-947.

54

Id.

55

This argument is premised on the claim that firms behave as if they are risk neutral. Assume, for example,
that there is a distribution of possible judicial interpretations of a particular contract. A risk neutral party wants
the mean of this distribution to be at the correct interpretation; that is, for the court to be right “on average.”
Thus, risk neutral firms prefer to limit enforcement costs—say by resolving interpretation disputes by summary
judgment—so long as the courts interpretations are correct on average. It follows that sophisticated parties
(i.e., firms) are more reluctant to expend resources to shrink the variance around the correct mean. Conditional
on the quality of the court, variance falls as more evidence is introduced. Thus, such parties prefer to limit the
evidence that is introduced in litigation. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 4, at 930 passim; Schwartz & Scott,
supra note 49, at 580.
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contract interpreted according to the disfavored approach. Thus, the on-going interpretation
debate is not only binary—either the parties exercise freedom to contract as they please or a
court protects vulnerable parties from error—but also winner-take-all—in any particular
“jurisdiction” victory is total for one approach or the other.56 As we will see, however, the two
approaches differ importantly in how imperialist is their claim. A textualist approach does not
reject context but instead embeds it in contract design—the parties, not the court, choose the
extent to which a court can consider context at the enforcement stage. The next section shows
the importance of that difference. The two prototypes that define the text versus context debate
represent only a small part of the range of circumstances in which issues of interpretation arise.
C. Beyond the Text and Context Prototypes: The Many Faces of Contract and the
Central Role of Uncertainty and Scale
This debate has suffered from a fundamental problem: the focus on the traditional
contractual prototypes disguises the fact that contemporary contract practice is far more varied
and heterogeneous than is conventionally understood either by courts or by most scholarly
treatments. The prototypical contractual transactions that have defined the debate do not capture
the diversity of circumstances confronting contracting parties, and so cannot capture the ways in
which the transactional environment influences the “contracting space”: the wide range of
institutional design choices available for both legally sophisticated and legally unsophisticated
parties to address interpretation. Viewed in this larger frame we can see that the choice of
interpretive style is distributed among a range of private and public interpretive regimes lodged
in very different institutional structures. These interpretive regimes then function as
complements to common law adjudication rather than as antagonists.
The starting point of our analysis is the claim that two critical characteristics of the
particular contracting environment—the thickness of that market and the uncertainty associated
56

As noted above, the “jurisdictional” divide between textualist and contexualist interpretive styles varies along two
dimensions: first, the states themselves divide along textualist and contextualist lines in their interpretation of
disputes arising under the common law of contracts; and, second, there is a further division within textualist
common law states between those disputes that arise under the common law of contracts and those that involve sales
transactions governed by the contextualist style of the U.C.C.
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with it—determine how contracting parties (or other interpretive bodies) deal with interpretation
issues in designing their contracts. We show below in Part III that in contracts between legally
sophisticated commercial parties, these two characteristics—uncertainty and scale—influence
contract design in ways that are not captured by either the textualist or contextualist prototypes.57
When markets are thin and the actors few and scattered, legally sophisticated parties
design bilateral interpretive structures to govern their relationship. Here the level of uncertainty
will determine precisely how the parties respond to the challenges of contract design. When
uncertainty is low, legally sophisticated parties in bilateral relationships can turn to bespoke
contracting: By integrating the relevant context into a complete, formal agreement they can
specify precisely the evidentiary base available to a court while still preserving the court’s
historic role in policing opportunism.58 But as uncertainty increases, legally sophisticated parties
will resort to an interpretive regime that braids state contingent rules with general standards that
require a context for interpretation, while at the same time guiding the court in what context
matters.59 Finally, when uncertainty is high, bilateral contracting over product specification can
break down completely; the problem is that the parties cannot specify the product that will be
produced, let alone the price or terms of sale.60 Rather, in the process of collaboration, the
parties develop interpretive mechanisms based on rich and regular exchange of information on a
project’s progress that allows each gradually to ascertain the other’s capacity jointly to define
and produce a product.61 Context thus becomes endogenous: the contract process is designed to
create context rather than respond to it. The result is a bilateral contract that specifies not the
terms of an exchange, but an interpretive framework designed to delegate to a court only the task
57

See infra Part III.A.1.
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See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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See infra Part III.B.3.
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In previous work, we identified what is loosely called “the information revolution” as the exogenous shock that
marked the emergence of collaborative contracting in global supply chains, platform production and project
development. Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 11, at 441. These novel interpretive structures are used with
increasing frequency in the search for new partners who can collaborate on joint investment in the production of
information to evaluate whether a project is profitable to pursue. These types of bilateral arrangements typically take
the form of preliminary agreements or letters of intent, as they are termed in the context of corporate acquisitions.
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See infra text accompanying note 135.
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of sanctioning defections from the commitment to collaborate.62
Where markets are thick, economies of scale have led commercial parties toward
specialized collective regimes to resolve their disputes or address common risks reliably and at
acceptable cost.63 The greater the number of traders engaged in a transaction, the more likely
that the contracting infrastructure will be provided jointly by a trade association as a club or
(industry specific) public good. When collective action problems are severe, or when the costs
to the public of breakdowns in contracting is likely to be high, public interpretive authorities may
collaborate with trade associations in providing such goods.64 In these circumstances, the parties
delegate to the collective effort the task of providing the context relevant to a dispute and the
collective itself is legally sophisticated. When uncertainty is low the chief goal is to render
insider understanding in terms that can be incorporated into everyday contracting, establish
specialized methods for the expeditious resolution of disputes arising under these contracts, and
institutionalize a process for updating terms and forms of dispute resolution in response to
developments. When uncertainty is high the chief problem is not establishing the terms of
bilateral exchange but rather developing protocols that protect buyers and sellers against hazards
that could catastrophically affect them all, and can only be mitigated by joint efforts as in the
threat of contamination in the commercial food chain.65
Contracts involving legally unsophisticated parties are equally influenced by uncertainty
and scale but in ways that argue for special treatment. In the case of consumers, for example,
mass markets are thick in our typology by definition. However, consumers must resolve nearly
insurmountable collective action problems to secure economies of scale in contracting; the
promise of scale and its realization are separated by the friction of coordination. The lessons of
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scale that have stimulated commercial parties to create specialized interpretive regimes argue for
a similar response to consumer contracts: regulation can overcome the coordination costs to
create interpretive regimes for consumer contracting that parallel those designed by legally
sophisticated commercial parties to capture scale economies. In consumer law the EU provides
the most prominent example of this type of regime: framework legislation cabins consumer
contracts from commercial transactions and blacklists practices regarded as intrinsically unfair to
the less sophisticated party.66
Similarly, the design choices of legally unsophisticated commercial parties are also
influenced by scale and uncertainty but in ways that, absent exceptional institutional settings, are
unlikely to optimize contracting costs. The merchant sellers and buyers of goods that are the
archetype of this category engage in repeated dealings in fairly thick markets. But transactions of
the same type with the same kind of party are insufficiently frequent and regular to justify
investments in creating and updating an industry code with precise contract terms. Yet, neither
are these parties able to bear the costs of writing elaborate bespoke contracts for individual
transactions that we observe for larger transactions in the absence of scale. Hence, legally
unsophisticated commercial parties use standard form prefabricated designs in the form of
invoices, purchase order and acknowledgment documents. In Part IV.B we argue that the result
of these constraints is to assign the decision-making role by default to generalist courts that are
expected to be contextualist. The dilemma is that courts are asked to determine the operative
customs and practices in a dynamic environment in which this task is, quite literally, impossible
to perform successfully. Only in a few exceptional instances where concentrations of similar
cases create an expert judiciary do we see the emergence of an interpretive regime capable of
fulfilling the role historically assigned to the courts of equity at common law.
In the discussion that follows, we develop this taxonomy is greater detail. But first we
turn to history to explore how the emergence of the two polar interpretive regimes from the
common law made the debate between them—in hindsight limited and even misleading—long
seem ineluctable.
66

The role of courts in this regime is limited but critically important: Courts eliminate procedural obstacles to the
vindication of these consumer rights, and ensure that opportunistic consumers do not game their protections to
exploit traders. See infra text accompanying notes 168-175.

26

II. THE SOURCES OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
The preceding discussion underscores a fundamental normative premise of the
contextualist approach to interpretation: generalist courts, with the benefit of hindsight, are able
to determine the context necessary to correctly interpret contracts. In this Part, we argue that the
claim of generalist competence was serviceably true under historical circumstances that no
longer prevail: the early courts of equity were effectively able to contextualize contracts because
they functioned within highly structured communities of which they were an integral part, and
were thus likely to be knowledgeable about the context surrounding any interpretive dispute that
came before them. In effect, fifteenth century courts of equity were specialized in the narrow
range of activities with which they were presented. In contrast, contemporary courts are
operating in a heterogeneous and rapidly changing economy, of which their institutional position
affords little detailed knowledge or experience.
Historically, the English common law applied two different sets of doctrines to interpret a
disputed contract.67 The first consisted of rules—such as the parol evidence and plain meaning
rules—cast in objective terms that minimized the need for subjective judgment in their
application. They were administered strictly, without exceptions for cases in which the
application of a rule appeared to defeat its purpose in a particular case. These doctrines
originated in the first seven centuries of adjudication in King’s Bench and Common Pleas, the
English courts that produced the corpus of the common law from the twelfth to the nineteenth
century.68 The second set of doctrines consisted largely of equitable principles originating in the
English Court of Chancery, which, by the end of the fourteenth century, began to exercise
overlapping jurisdiction with the common law courts to hear cases that “in the ordinary course of
law failed to provide justice.”69 These doctrines were framed as broad principles administered
loosely, and were designed to provide exceptions to the common law interpretive rules. They
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were generally cast in subjective terms and therefore required judges to exercise such judgment
by evaluating the context of the particular transaction.70
A. The Contrasting Approaches of Law and Equity
The Chancery provided an independent and alternative forum as a response both to the
procedural constraints imposed on the common law courts, and to the strict, rule-bound
inclination of common law judges to apply the common law rigorously without reference to the
context of the case.71 In short, the common law courts provided justice wholesale: common law
judges “preferred to suffer hardship in individual cases than to make exceptions to clear rules.”72
In this sense, the common law understood its doctrines as devices for prospective regulation: As
long as its rules were known in advance and the costs of complying with them were reasonable,
its doctrines should be based on their long-term, prospective benefits, not their impact on parties
to an individual case at the time of adjudication.73
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In contrast, “the Chancellor’s eyes were not blinkered by [the rules] and he could go into
all the facts to the extent that the available evidence permitted.”74 The Chancery’s sole focus
was on just and fair dispute resolution: Its concern in interpretive disputes was with the equities
of the case at bar, not the prospective effects of a ruling. Indeed, for many years the Chancery’s
decrees had no formal precedential effect,75 which initially freed the Chancery from any concern
that its contextualized rulings could undermine the consistency and predictability of adjudication.
Moreover, in pre-industrial England the Chancery was more intimately familiar with the
contextual environment of typical party disputes and could fairly sort relevant from irrelevant
facts. Thus, even though the Chancery reversed or avoided outcomes dictated by the formal
interpretive rules,76 these actions could be seen as necessary in order to vindicate, rather than
undermine, the common law.77
Fundamentally, however, the institutions of the common law and the Chancery were at
cross-purposes. The common law viewed the adjudication of cases primarily as a means of
creating and sustaining a system of rules justified by their effects over time. In contrast, the
Chancery viewed the adjudication of cases as an end in itself, in which the sole objective was to
do justice between the parties. The result was two competing systems, often with incompatible
procedural and substantive doctrines, yet overlapping in jurisdiction.
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B. Text Versus Context: The Legal and Equitable Roots of American Contract Law
The system of equitable principles created by the Chancery has left an indelible
impression on the contemporary common law of the United States. Historically, the division
between the common law courts and the court of Chancery acted as a barrier between the two
incompatible regimes. But in the nineteenth century, the Chancery was eliminated and law and
equity were merged in both England and the United States.78 The result was an uncomfortable
combination of legal and equitable doctrines; and it was this awkward amalgam that formed the
matrix of American contract law.
To this day, therefore, American contract law is torn between the prospective interpretive
perspective of common-law rules and the retrospective dispute-resolution perspective of
equitable doctrines.79 This tension is embodied in the rules governing the interpretation of
contracts. The contract interpretation doctrines originating in the English common law courts
included the fundamental protections of textualism, the plain meaning80 and parole evidence81
rules. But along with these rules, American contract law also absorbed doctrines originally
developed in Chancery “to mitigate the rigours of the Common law.”82 These included equitable
doctrines specifically inviting the court to rely on the factual context of the particular dispute in
78
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derogation of the common law rules of interpretation.83 Conflicts are inevitable among doctrines
that require courts to be both generalists and specialists in resolving disputes across a
heterogeneous contracting population. Thus, the text versus context tension is baked into the
merger of law and equity.
The struggle between the common law rules of interpretation and the equitable
exceptions to those rules was rationalized, at least formally, by Samuel Williston, the author of
one of the great twentieth century treatises, into a purportedly coherent set of general rules (and
exceptions) that could be applied predictably by common law courts.84 Willistonian formalism
rested on several basic claims: that contract terms could be interpreted according to their
ordinary meaning; and that written terms have priority over unwritten expressions of
agreement.85 Williston viewed merger clauses as presumptively establishing a total integration
of the agreement sufficient to exclude extrinsic evidence.86 In the absence of a merger clause, he
argued that if the writing appeared to be a complete instrument, it should be found to be a total
integration unless additional terms offered by the counterparty were those that might naturally be
included in a separate agreement covering those terms.87 These views on parol evidence had a
significant influence on the doctrines adopted by many state courts as they decided interpretation
disputes, and Williston’s formalist approach to interpretation was subsequently enshrined in the
First Restatement of Contracts.88

83

See, e.g., WILLIAM STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 153-157 (W.E. Grigsby ed., 1884)
(describing the equitable exceptions to the parol evidence rule).
84

WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 631 (3d ed. 1961) (“The parol evidence rule requires, in the absence of fraud, duress,
mutual mistake or something of the kind, the exclusion of extrinsic evidence, oral or written, where the parties have
reduced their agreement to an integrated writing.”). For discussion, see Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender
Liability, and Discretionary Acceleration: Of Wittgenstein, and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 TEX. L. REV.
169, 187-88 (1989).
85

Patterson, supra note 84, at 187-88.

86

11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §33:2. For discussion, see PERILLO, supra note 43, at 115-116.

87

11 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §32:25.

88

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 240 (1932).

31

But the tensions between law and equity persisted just beneath the surface of the newly
unified law of contract. They were elevated to prominence by the legal realists under the
leadership of Arthur Corbin and Karl Llewellyn. Corbin advanced the view that the Willistonian
rules governing interpretation were legal fictions and that, properly understood, all interpretation
issues were context specific.89 In his view, courts did (and should) apply rules tactically in order
to pursue overarching policy—meta principles of fairness and natural justice. In the case of an
interpretation dispute, the just result was to determine the actual intention of the contracting
parties.90 According to Corbin, in order to properly capture this intent, all relevant evidence
should be considered on any interpretive issue. Procedurally this meant the very evidence whose
admissibility was being challenged would be admissible on the issue of whether or not the
parties intended the writing to be a total integration. Indeed, Corbin argued, this result was
unavoidable: the very judgment as to whether particular contract language was sufficiently
unambiguous as to exclude consideration of extrinsic evidence required consideration of just that
evidence.91 Corbin’s approach severely undercut the application of the traditional parol evidence
and plain meaning rules. Adjudication, he believed, could not reach a fair result unless the court
considered the context of the transaction.92
Llewellyn advocated a similar commitment to context, although he located the meta
principle that courts must apply in the common “working rules” found in the practices of
commercial parties.93 The course of prior dealings between the parties together with the usages
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in the trade formed the implicit background for the explicit contracts between merchants
practicing within any particular commercial community. Moreover, the actual course of
performance under the agreement was the best evidence of the meaning the parties attached to
their written contract.94 But since the working rules arose from custom and practice their
jurisdiction was uncertain: they needed the imprimatur of the state. Legal incorporation was
necessary, therefore, in order to tailor the rules to particular practices and to resolve the
troublesome cases where the relevant norms were in dispute.95
This notion of incorporation of custom and practice was deeply imbedded in Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, of which Llewellyn was the principal drafter. Here, Llewellyn
addressed the incorporation objective by reversing the Willistonian presumption that the parties’
writings were the dispositive elements of the agreement.96 Rather, the Code invited
contextualization by defining a contract as “the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their
language or by implication from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage of
trade or course of performance . . . .”97 In addition, the new parol evidence rule under the Code
admitted inferences from trade usage even where the express terms of the contract seemed
perfectly clear and were apparently “integrated.”98
Unlike Corbin, however, Llewellyn believed that customary practice had only an
epistemological and not also a normative relevance.99 Indeed his reservations about generalist
courts were similar to our own,100 and he was thus unwilling to rely solely on their intuitions to
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undertake what was essentially an empirical inquiry. Since Llewellyn’s purpose was to
incorporate the actual context that commercial parties had developed through their practices, he
needed a mechanism by which these local norms could be identified by courts. In his mind, that
mechanism was the merchant tribunal, made up of a panel of experts that would find specific
facts—such as whether the behavior of a contracting party was “commercially reasonable” in the
context of the particular dispute.101 Unfortunately, the idea of the merchant tribunal was too
radical for the commercial lawyers who dominated the U.C.C. drafting process. Ultimately,
Llewellyn abandoned this key device for discovering the relevant context, while still retaining
the architecture of incorporation.102 As many have suggested, eliminating the merchant jury
while retaining the pervasive notion of incorporation of commercial norms was a serious drafting
mistake.103
And so, the battle between text and context persists to our day under a nominally unified
law of contract that applies its interpretation principles—whether text or context—to all
contractual settings. The common law courts have proved remarkably faithful to Willistonian
textualism. A large majority of courts retain “hard” parol evidence and plain meaning rules
while recognizing equitable exceptions for fraud, misrepresentation and the like.104 In these
jurisdictions, the risk is that unsophisticated parties may be trapped by the textualist rules that
work well in facilitating contract design by sophisticated commercial parties. At the same time,
a minority of courts have adopted Corbin’s commitment to context and, in sales law, the U.C.C.
remains fully committed to Llewellyn’s incorporation project.105 This commitment remains firm
even though the evidence is that courts generally have not attempted the empirical inquiry that
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Llewellyn believed essential to the success of the interpretive mission.106 In short, rather than a
set of interpretive doctrines that work to facilitate party preferences, we are left, instead, with the
worst of both worlds.
In the next two Parts, therefore, we shift the focus from ex post contract interpretation to
ex ante contract design in order to accommodate the two major deficits in the current doctrinal
regime: 1) the failure of generalist courts to perform successfully as arbiters of context in
disputes between commercial parties; and 2) the failure of a unitary law of contract to apply its
doctrines successfully to both legally sophisticated and unsophisticated contracting parties. We
first show in Part III that legally sophisticated commercial parties choose the appropriate mix of
text and context by crafting interpretive regimes that work in a complementary fashion with ex
post adjudication so long as courts attend to the environment in which particular parties design
their contracts. Interpretation becomes a matter of design, not doctrine. Commercial contractors
designing bespoke contracts combine both text and context but in very different ways depending
on the levels of uncertainty they are facing. When markets are thick and commercial parties can
design contracts collectively, they are able to standardize the context and develop modes of
interpretation that permit these standard understandings to be updated periodically, in effect,
endogenizing through design the process that Corbin sought through adjudication.
In Part IV we consider disputes where one or both of the parties are legally
unsophisticated. Here we distinguish between consumer transactions on the one hand, and
commercial transactions among parties for whom high transaction costs preclude them from
choosing ex ante contract design on the other. As we will see, contextualization by expert courts
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works well as a design choice for commercial transactions among such legally unsophisticated
parties. However, generalist courts have largely failed to accomplish the twin goals of a)
protecting consumers from difficult to detect forms of exploitation and b) capably using context
evidence to resolve disputes between legally unsophisticated commercial parties.

III. TEXT AND CONTEXT IN THE DESIGN OF CONTRACTS BY LEGALLY SOPHISTICATED
PARTIES
A. Choosing the Contract Form that Specifies the Role of Generalist Courts
The history of contract doctrine shows why common law courts have lost the capacity to
combine text and context successfully through the adjudicatory process. In contrast to early
English courts that were embedded in a homogenous economy, generalists courts today are
removed from the particular contracting context and therefore impaired in their ability to divine
how and when parties would braid both text and context in their contracts. Moreover, the merger
of law and equity has placed doctrines that traditionally worked in tandem, albeit separately, in
fundamental opposition one to the other. Contemporary textualist and contextualist theories thus
struggle for control of this tattered institutional setting, each claiming the right to govern
different transactional paradigms, knowing that, under current doctrine, rules of interpretation are
understood as mandatory and not subject to party choice—one size will be applied to all. Given
the variety of their situations, the limits of the generalist judiciary and the doctrinal logjam, it is
perhaps unsurprising that legally sophisticated commercial parties turn to creative contract
design to accomplish two objectives: first to provide clear instructions to courts as to the
appropriate mix of text and context; and, second, in light of those instructions, to invite courts to
retain their historic superintending role to guard against opportunistic behavior.
In this Part, we present a typology of the conditions under which legally sophisticated
commercial parties design contracts to accomplish their objectives. We characterize transaction
settings on two dimensions. The first is the level of uncertainty107—whether commercial
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practices are stable and predictable, or frequently disrupted by, and thus needing to adapt to
changes in technical possibilities and market conditions. The second is the scope or thickness of
the market—whether there are many traders or few engaged in a particular class of transaction.
All else equal, the higher the level of uncertainty, the more difficult it is for parties to write, and
courts to interpret complete, state-contingent contracts.
B. Designing Bespoke Contracts under Varying Conditions of Uncertainty
1. The Tradeoff between Front-end and Back-end Contracting Costs
In general, legally sophisticated parties’ designing bespoke contracts choose between
text and context by trading off the front-end (or drafting) costs of contracting and the back-end
(or enforcement) costs.108 The fulcrum of this balance between front-end text and back-end
context is the level of uncertainty.109 The scale of the particular contractual setting—that is, the
thickness of the market—dictates the institutions or interpretive regimes through which this
tradeoff is determined or influenced.110
Writing a complete (or state) contingent contract that specifies ex ante the outcome in
each future state of the world significantly reduces ex post enforcement costs by dramatically
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reducing (if not eliminating) the need for courts to inquire into context. Such a contract not only
provides the court with a clear and complete statement of the parties’ obligations, but by
reducing factual inquiry it also reduces the likelihood of opportunistic litigation driven by moral
hazard on the part of the losing party.111 Where both obligations and performance are observable
and verifiable as in a complete contract, the likelihood of a court making a mistake in
interpreting the contract is reduced and, correspondingly, so is the incentive for the party
disfavored by the contract’s outcome to engage in the litigation in the first place. Fidelity to the
contractual text thus reduces the need for resort to context to address unanticipated events as well
as the opportunity for a losing party to exploit the court’s discretion by seeking to persuade it to
reallocate losses assigned to the losing party by the contract. In the setting of a state contingent
contract, therefore, courts are less mistake prone and parties less likely to encourage mistakes,
resulting in less enforcement uncertainty and cost.
But the greater the uncertainty associated with a contract—the more difficult for the
contracting parties to specify all the future states of the world in which the contract will have to
be performed and the actions to be taken in each of those states—the more the contracting parties
confront a dilemma.112 They can choose specific rules covering possible outcomes, but in the
face of uncertainty this approach comes at the cost of an increased likelihood that the ex antespecified state contingencies will turn out to be incomplete or simply wrong ex post.113 With this
level of uncertainty, the parties may be better served by using a standard-based measure of
performance—commercial reasonableness, for example—rather than detailed but incomplete or
erroneous state contingent rules.114 Because a court applies a standard only after future events
have occurred, the court will have more information, including the actual context of
performance, then did the parties when they wrote the contract. As uncertainty increases,
consideration of the context of performance in interpreting a standard thus has the potential to
improve the accuracy of the outcome of any litigation, although with a concomitant increase in
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expected litigation costs. So the greater the ex ante uncertainty, the potentially more important
the ex post resort to standards and therefore to context, but with the increased potential for
judicial mistake and opportunistic-motivated litigation. This tradeoff directly influences how the
parties design their contracts so as to optimize the front-end and the back-end costs of
contracting.
As we will see, three characteristics of the contracting process complicate the relationship
between uncertainty and the parties’ choice of an interpretive regime that determines how much
discretion to delegate to a court to ascertain and apply context ex post. The first is that the
subject matter of the contract affects the extent to which judicial discretion over context
increases enforcement costs. Where the subject matter of the contract makes the relevant context
both observable and verifiable, the parties can more easily specify the relevant context and courts
are less likely to make an error in applying a standard in resolving litigation.
Second, the experience and expertise of the court or other adjudicative body who must
determine and apply the relevant context affects the back-end costs of contracting, in particular
the possibility that the court will make a mistake and, hence, the incentive for the disadvantaged
party to pursue litigation. This experience and expertise, in turn, is a function of scale: The
larger number the number of parties contracting over the same range of activities, the more likely
courts will develop experience and expertise, which to some extent reduces the risk of error and
thus of moral hazard-based litigation. As well, the larger the number of parties contracting over
similar transactions, the more feasible it is to have collective determinations of context other than
by means of formal adjudication, as through the adoption of industry standards or other joint
efforts.115
Finally, the relationship between uncertainty and the decision to delegate discretion to a
court is not monotonic. At some point, uncertainty becomes so pervasive that the parties cannot
anticipate or specify the relevant context ex ante even through the invocation of broad standards
of reasonableness and the like. Here the back-end costs of litigation, and especially the potential
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for moral hazard, then become so large that sophisticated parties forgo both text and context with
respect to their substantive relation by resorting to collaborative contracting and other novel
contract forms.116 These new forms of contracting, which we have documented extensively in
our earlier work,117 function to confine the courts ex post discretion. By using radically
incomplete contracts as a means of limiting a reviewing court’s jurisdiction to the commitment to
collaborate rather than extending to performance of any substantive obligations that grow out of
the collaboration, the parties rely entirely on informal mechanisms to enforce any contractual
performance obligations.
2. Low Uncertainty and Few Parties: The State-Contingent Contract Setting
When uncertainty is low, sophisticated parties, even when acting in bilateral relations,
can come close to designing a regime that embodies a complete contingent contract—the discrete
contract setting in legal terminology.118 Of course, we observe few circumstances where
bespoke contracting can be this prescient. However, parties that are confident that they can
approximate this ideal design contracts that specify dispute resolution by a generalist court but
with clear instructions to confine interpretation to the text of the agreement. Because these
parties can anticipate the context in which performance will occur, the contract itself will reflect
it. Discursive exposition of goals, expectations and business plans, whether in the contract’s
preamble or in particular sections, can supplement precise specifications of outcomes while still
constraining a court’s discretion to range more widely than the parties want. Consider, for
example, the design choices open to sophisticated parties who wish to embed relevant context in
their agreement. These parties can (and do) create a bilateral interpretive regime that provides
clear directions to a court of the context within which the contract should be interpreted.119 Such
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a regime might include (a) “whereas” or “purpose” clauses that describe the parties’ business
plan and the transaction;120 (b) definition clauses that ascribe particular meanings to words and
terms that may vary from their plain meaning;121 and (c) appendices that provide more precise
specifications governing performance as well as any memoranda the parties want an interpreting
court to consider in interpreting the contract’s text.122 Alternatively, the parties can specify in
the agreement that the meaning of terms should be interpreted according to the customs and
usages of a particular trade or industry.123 Casual empiricism suggests that legally sophisticate
commercial parties who write customized contracts that incorporate different mixtures of text
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For example, see the following “purpose” clause from the Fountain Manufacturing Agreement between Apple
Computer, Inc. and SCI Systems, Inc. (May 31, 1996) [hereinafter Apple/SCI Manufacturing Agreement], available
at http://contracts.onecle.com/apple/scis.mfg.1996.05.31.shtml:
PURPOSE
Apple and SCI entered into a Stock Purchase Agreement on April 4, 1996 (the
"Stock Purchase Agreement") pursuant to which SCI will purchase Apple's
manufacturing facility located at 702 Bandley Drive, Fountain, Colorado
("Fountain") and certain related assets.
The parties desire that Apple engage SCI to assemble, test and package
certain Products, Service Units and Spare Parts, as defined below, on a
turnkey basis at Fountain on the terms and conditions of this Agreement.
This Agreement defines the general terms and conditions governing all
transactions between them for Products, Service Units and Spare Parts
manufactured at Fountain. Individual "Product Plans" attached as Addenda to
this Agreement, and incorporated herein by reference, define the specific terms
and conditions for each Product, Service Unit and/or Spare Part. The initial
Product Plans are attached to Exhibit A and numbered A-1 through A-11.
Additional Products and Product Plans may be added to this Agreement by addenda
to Exhibit A signed by both parties. Such addenda will be numbered
sequentially, A-12, A-13 and so on.
In consideration of the above and the mutual promises contained herein, Apple
and SCI agree as follows:
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and context pursue all of these strategies in one degree or another.
The contractual designation of context is not the only technique available to these
contracting parties in a low uncertainty environment. Sometimes the difficulty in proving
(verifying) the relevant context to a court can present a barrier to incorporating context in the
written contract. Under these conditions, the parties can design an interpretive regime that uses
options to overcome the non-verifiability of the relevant context.124 For example, consider a
research contract between a large pharmaceutical company and a small biotech where the parties
may both know and be able to observe the relevant context a court should apply, but be unable to
specify that context in the agreement. In this case, options can protect the pharma from two
types of opportunistic behavior by the biotech in providing the contracted-for research. First, the
biotech, which typically has a number of research projects with other companies as well as
proprietary research, may be tempted to use the contractual payments to cross-subsidize other
projects, to the disadvantage of the pharma and its project. Second, the concern is that the
biotech will be disproportionately benefited from academic research vis-a-vis the pharma and
will underinvest in the commercially oriented research desired by the pharmaceutical in favor of
investments in academic research.125
Here the problem is not uncertainty—both parties know and understand the object of the
contract and the desired inputs to performance. The uncertainty relates only to output.126 In this
circumstance, the biotech can be policed by granting the pharmaceutical an unconditional option
to terminate the relationship and secure broad property rights to the research output on payment
of a termination fee. The termination fee, in turn, constrains responsive opportunism by the
pharmaceutical company. This use of options may viably substitute for the ex ante incorporation
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of context in a low uncertainty environment because the inputs that may be subject to
opportunism are fully observable by the contracting parties even if not verifiable to a court.127
3. Context and Contracting with Moderate Uncertainty: Bilateral Contracts
with Standards
Now suppose the contracting parties confront moderate uncertainty, such that they can
identify what should happen in some but not every future state of the world. One clear example
is the hiring of a specialized agent, say a sales representative. The parties can specify what they
want the agent to accomplish as matters stand at the time of drafting the contract: they can
identify the category of product and customer, or geographic region, and they can specify sales
goals. But they cannot detail how the agent will try to market the product, how the agent will
allocate her time across different products, or what adjustments the agent should make if market
conditions change or competitors alter their strategy, perhaps in response to her activity.
Similarly, the party charged with securing regulatory approval and commercializing a new drug
under a license from the owner of the intellectual property is typically charged with using
“commercially reasonable efforts” to accomplish these tasks, reflecting the fact that the
appropriate strategy is dependent on the sequential outcome of uncertain events, including the
results of clinical tests, the path of the regulatory process, and competitive conditions—what
other drugs have entered the market—by the time that interpretive approval is secured and
commercialization can begin.
In this range of uncertainty, parties combine precise terms—state contingent rules—and
contractual standards that carry with them directions about the context through which the
standard should be applied. In the sales examples, and in other circumstances when one party
contracts for the counterparty’s expertise, the ultimate aim of the contract is to secure the
counterparty’s active exercise of judgment. When circumstances change in an unanticipated way
the agent’s obligation is to apply their expertise to adjusting effectively to the new conditions.
This form of relationship is memorialized in a formal contract by the use of a standard such as
127
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best efforts: a characterization rather than a specification of the contracted for performance.
Commercial contracts often include both precise rules and general standards, and courts
actively interpret and enforce such standards by reference to context evidence. For example,
contracts may state one party’s performance obligation as to make “commercially reasonable
efforts,” “reasonable efforts” or “reasonable best efforts.”128 In terms of the tradeoff between ex
ante and ex post contracting costs, the use of a standard as opposed to a rule necessarily increases
ex post contracting costs. It is harder to verify performance when specified by a standard; the
court must first identify a “proxy” against which to measure performance, an intermediate step
that is not required when the contract specifies the terms of performance.129 For this reason,
disagreement over whether a performance standard has been met is much less amenable to pretrial resolution than is a rule, and the potential for moral hazard—the party disfavored by the
change in circumstances opportunistically resorting to litigation to mislead a court into
reallocating the burden of events in its favor—is increased.
Under these conditions of moderate uncertainty, standards also have special utility.
Courts assess performance with respect to standards only after the relevant future events have
occurred. Thus parties can obtain the advantage of hindsight: at the time for dispute resolution,
the court has information that at the time of drafting the contract the parties lacked. Thus, here
the parties design a interpretive regime that combines rules and standards so as to optimize the
admissibility of context evidence over two dimensions: when the court will look to context and
who decides what context matters.130 The combination of general and specific terms, therefore,
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offers sophisticated contracting parties the ability to combine the text with context evidence that
is revealed over the course of contract performance.131 The more effectively context can be
harnessed to resolve uncertainty in the judicial application of contractual standards, the more
attractive the use of standards that take advantage of the court’s better information ex post.
When and to the extent parties design a regime that deploys broad standards depends on a
particular form of uncertainty—how effectively context can be used to reduce the risk that a
court will (or can be persuaded to) misunderstand or misapply the standard. As discussed earlier,
the outcome will depend in the first instance on the subject matter of the contract and the
industry, and on the surrounding circumstances. At one end of a continuum, if the subject
matter, industry and surrounding circumstances are themselves clear enough to narrow the
context that will appear relevant to a reviewing court, the parties will need to do little more
through drafting beyond a reference such as “commercial reasonableness.” Alternatively, at the
drafting stage the parties can specify in greater detail the context that will be relevant—what
industry, what kind of products and, when possible, even the relevant proxy the court should use
to measure performance under the standard. In both cases, the contractually specified standard
directs the court to make use of context in addition to text, but limits its inquiry into context to
that relevant to the particular obligation embedded in the standard. As with bespoke contracting
under conditions of low uncertainty, the parties in designing the contract choose the interpretive
regime—the balance between text and context that best suits the level and kind of uncertainty the
transaction protects.
4. Collaborative Contracting

probability distributions. Because the parties cannot foresee all contingencies they can delegate to the court the task
of completing the contract ex post by considering relevant context. They indicate this intention by adopting a
general contract term—a standard—that directs the court to limit its efforts to recovering only that context evidence
relevant to the particular obligation embedded in the contractually specified term. Scott & Triantis, supra note 52, at
843-45.
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What happens when uncertainty is high but traders are few, and their relations are of
necessity idiosyncratic? Here the thinness of the market motivates the parties to create bilateral
interpretive regimes for exploring possibilities for collaboration without creating intolerable
mutual vulnerability to opportunism. Neither textual or contextual interpretation is helpful since
under high uncertainty the parties themselves can neither set prospective rules to govern their
conduct, nor even specify the relevant context by which conduct might be assessed. This
solution to this problem is exemplified by what we have elsewhere called “contracting for
innovation.”132 In these circumstances, parties are contracting over the creation of something
whose features, and the contributions of each of the parties, are unknowable and will emerge
only after many iterations between the contracting parties. Moreover, this uncertainty will not be
resolved by the passage of time, as is the case where a court can use context to apply a standard
after events have resolved uncertainty. Rather, the uncertainty is continuous; the object of the
contracting process will continue to evolve and new elements of uncertainty arise to replace
those that have been resolved.133
Thus, when uncertainty is high and continuous, the parties cannot trade off between ex
ante and ex post contracting costs. No stable ex post period arises in which standards energized
by judicial hindsight and resort to context pursuant to the parties’ contractual direction can be
used to fill in uncertainty-driven gaps in an incomplete formal contract. The contracting problem
then is to craft a structure that is neither state contingent nor standard-based, and that a) induces
efficient, transaction-specific investment by both parties, b) establishes a framework for iterative
collaboration and adjustment of the parties’ obligations under conditions of continuing
uncertainty—circumstances when the resolution of one element of uncertainty merely gives rise
to another, and c) limits the risk of opportunism that could undermine the incentive to make
relation-specific investments in the first place.134
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The common challenges facing parties designing collaborative interpretive regimes give
rise to solutions with common elements: the parties design a interpretive structure that braids
formal and informal contracts in a fashion that is neither state contingent nor standard-based,
because it does not address performance of any substantive obligations at all. In general, the
formal contract is process rather than outcome oriented. It defines a process of collaboration—
typically an regime of ongoing review and information exchange by which the parties mutually
evaluate their capacities and intentions—that substitutes functionally for ex ante specification of
the desired product that high uncertainty renders impossible by building trust that responds to the
fact that specifications are the outcome of contracting for innovation not an input.135 Thus, in
sharp contrast to contracting in low uncertainty environments, the process, if successful, defines
the specification, not the other way around. In each case, the parties make relation-specific
investments in learning about their collaborator’s capabilities and the nature of the project that
raise the costs of switching to new partners, and so restrain either party from taking advantage of
their mutual dependence.136
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Accordingly, the parties designing a collaborative contact craft an interpretive regime in
which, despite—indeed, because of—the high uncertainty, there is no role for a court to
incorporate context in resolving disputes between the parties. The uncertainty exists with respect
to whether a product in the end will be developed, whether actual sales will result, and how the
parties will continue to interact in the future. But because the uncertainty concerning these
matters is so high and continuous, the parties do not contract over outcomes at the outset; there is
no substantive set of contractual obligations for a court to enforce. Rather, the parties design the
collaborative process to build switching costs through formally specified process-based learning,
and then rely on informal enforcement mechanisms for substance. Put differently, in the face of
high and continuous uncertainty, resolving disputes over the obligations that arise out of this
relationship cannot be delegated to generalist courts; the parties create their own means of
enforcing their commitments to each other context through a contractually specified process.
The effect of this design framework is to limit judicial oversight to sanctioning “red-faced” abuse
of the information exchange process-oriented regime—i.e., the secret misappropriation by one
party of knowledge gained in the collaboration to another venture—without inviting a court to
convert the exploration of collaborative possibilities into a contractual obligation to actually do
so.137

5. Summary
In this part, we have described how legally sophisticated parties contracting over a
discrete transaction design interpretive regimes that specify the mix of textual and contextual
since by definition the product that may come out of the collaborative process cannot be specified at the outset. So
how do the parties address the purchases and sales that ultimately will result from a successful collaboration? That
commitment emerges from the resulting trust relationship, where the barrier to ex post opportunism results from
increased switching costs generated by the collaboration process itself. Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 11, at 484.
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interpretive elements, and so the extent to which generalist courts are delegated the role of
applying context in interpreting the contract. The parties do not choose text or context. Rather
the parties choose the mixture of text and context that fits the underlying transaction, ranging
from a) bespoke state contingent contracts that reject any ex post context, to b) contracts that
combine precise terms with general standards that a court will interpret ex post subject to the
parties’ specification of the context the court should apply, to c) contracts where the very point is
to specify a collaborative process through which the parties will create the context that supports
the subsequent informal mechanisms that will govern their substantive obligations going
forward. We have shown that the specific mix of text and context the contracting parties choose
is driven by the impact of uncertainty on the tradeoff between the ex ante and ex post costs of
contracting. Text and context, not text or context. Figure 1 stylizes the relation between
uncertainty and these contracting parties’ resort to generalist courts to apply context to
contractual interpretation. This relationship is not monotonic.
Figure One
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At low levels of uncertainty, parties will exclude ex post judicial resort to context. The
gain in precision from filling small gaps in contractually specified contingencies with broad
standards to be applied ex post by courts is outweighed by the moral-hazard based incentive to
litigate that results from the realization of adverse events.m As uncertainty increases such that
the parties can specify the goal but not the steps that must be taken to achieve it, nor the
accommodations that would be required by changes in the commercial environment, resort to
standards—like commercial reasonableness—that invite judicial explorations of context becomes
compelling. Here, by crafting the reference to context in a fashion that focuses the court’s
inquiry, whether through the substance of the contract or the clarity of the relevant industry, the
parties can get the benefit of judicial hindsight but with limits on the cost of litigation. Since the
success of moral hazard motivated litigation depends on the court making an interpretive
mistake, the expertise and experience of the court reduces the likelihood of mistake and hence
the incentive to bring such litigation. Thus, resort to better courts expands the range of
uncertainty over which the parties can rely on judicially interpreted standards. Finally, as
uncertainty becomes fully Knightian, and state contingent contracting becomes close to
impossible rather than merely gap-ridden, reliance on generalist courts to interpret context drops
dramatically; the parties’ formal contractual arrangement then focuses on specifying a
collaborative process, the goal of which is to create the context that will support the informal
mechanisms of trust that will regulate the actual provision of goods and services.

C. Designing Contracts with Scale under Varying Degrees of Uncertainty: Multilateral
Interpretive Regimes
As the number of parties contracting over similar transactions increases, the range of
interpretive options available to the parties increases. With scale, knowledge of the relevant
context is located in the parties and not readily accessible to a generalist court whose knowledge
must necessarily come through the litigation process. As we saw in Part II.B, this is the setting
that concerned Karl Llewellyn, where generalist courts simply could not access the collective
knowledge held by numerous parties of the context in which they acted and hence could not
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determine the context necessary to interpret contracts.138 Llewellyn’s response to generalist
courts’ information disadvantage was to substitute a merchant jury for the court as the vehicle for
applying context. We show in this section that Llewellyn had the problem right but the answer
wrong. Rather than mandating a particular mechanism by which the relevant market’s collective
knowledge of context could be extracted, we observe that, as with bespoke contracts, the parties
themselves determine the collective interpretive regimes by which context is applied to their
contracts. And as with bespoke contracts, the design of these collective mechanisms is
importantly a function of the level of uncertainty associated with the particular category of
transaction.
1. Low Uncertainty and the Problem of Judicial Ignorance
Take first the setting where trade practices are stable and well understood by a substantial
community of traders. Uncertainty is low, as with bilateral state contingent contracts, but
markets are thick. Here the presence of scale allows an approach different from bespoke
contracts: the key contract design choices are made collectively. The contracting parties act
through trade organizations and similar collective entities that can take advantage of scale
economies to formulate a contractual design that reduces contracting costs for all the individual
members of the community. But despite the regularities of dealings, and the trading
community’s easy familiarity with their particulars and the distinctive vulnerabilities to which
they can give rise, a generalist court cannot reasonably be expected to have knowledge of trade
practices or be able conveniently to obtain it. The problem here, in other words, is that a
generalist judge is and will remain ignorant of the common knowledge of the trade. The key
design strategy, therefore, is to render insider understanding in terms that can be incorporated
into everyday contracting, establish methods for the expeditious resolution of disputes arising
under these agreements, and institutionalize a process for keeping terms and forms of dispute
resolution abreast of developments.
In “The Case of the Spoiled Cantaloupes,” Hart and Sacks describe, under the name of an
“institutional settlement,” just such a collective regime for the regulation of contracting in
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perishable agricultural commodities.139 The regime was initially created to address a disruptive
practice (the “rejection evil”) that recurrently threatened commerce in these goods: When prices
fell against them, buyers evaded their commitments by using minor nonconformities as pretexts
to reject—as we have seen, this is the standard move by the party who has been disadvantaged
by the resolution of uncertainty. Small shippers were typically unable to salvage rejected goods
or to pursue litigation in distant locales. The dispersed and fragmented character of the industry
impeded efforts, over decades, to address the problem through coordination of private trade
associations. In 1930, Congress passed the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, which
makes it a violation of federal law for “any dealer to reject or fail to deliver . . . without
reasonable cause any perishable agricultural commodity” in an interstate transaction. The Act
instructs the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate regulations to guide interpretation of
contract terms allocating risks specific to the industry between buyers and sellers, to operate an
arbitration process to adjudicate claims at reasonable costs, and to administer a licensing scheme
to screen irresponsible buyers and sellers from the industry. Here the strategy is to use
legislation as a coordinating mechanism that had been lacking.
In the case from which the problem was derived, a Springfield, Massachusetts,
wholesaler rejected an extensively spoiled shipment of melons that did not satisfy the contractual
specification and abandoned the cantaloupes at the loading dock in Springfield, from where the
railroad eventually disposed of them for salvage value.140 The Chicago broker who sold the fruit
sued for the contract price. The district court, disregarding the PACA regime, treated the case
under the general law of sales, and held that the buyer’s obligation to the seller for the purchase
price could be reduced by the decrease in value caused by the cantaloupes’ nonconformity. Prior
to the adoption of the U.C.C., the common law of sales was ambiguous as to whether the seller’s
shipment of nonconforming goods permitted the buyer to reject, instead of accepting and
claiming damages for their reduced value; whether, if there was found to be a right to reject, the
rejecting buyer had a duty to assist the seller by disposing of the spoiled goods; and whether the
buyer’s failure to salvage or wrongful rejection led to offsetting damages or a complete forfeiture
139

HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 10–68 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
140
Id. at 10-67.

52

of the purchase price. The common law thus seemed to lack the necessary resources for
effectiveness in this domain.141
The court of appeals reversed the district court decision on the ground that the buyer had
forfeited his right to offsetting damages by failing to salvage. Because forfeiture was developed
by the Department of Agriculture, under PACA, as a key to elimination of the rejection evil, the
court properly deferred to the institutional judgment of the collective entity that had designed the
contract. The determination of context is made by the collective mechanism, not by a generalist
court.142
As Lisa Bernstein has shown in well-known studies of contracting in the cotton, grain
and diamond industries,143 collective regimes of this kind frequently arise through private
organization, and disputes arising within them can be disposed of by private arbitration. But
public or private, dispute resolution in these regimes is “textualist”: parties are expected to
incorporate standard language into their contracts, and are held to its terms. Claims of a pattern
of dealings that diverges from the text are summarily rejected. This formalism is workable for
two reasons. First, it is underpinned by a interpretive regime providing for the updating of
formal standard terms through periodic consultation with the transaction parties—a collective
mechanism to determine context. Second, parties routinely diverge from the formal terms of the
contract—indeed, there is a course of dealings that does diverge from the text. However, the
arbitrators’ application of textualist interpretation relegates divergence from the text to informal
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relational contracting supported by a reputation mechanism. If the parties feared that the
arbitrators would take informal adjustments into account, they would be unwilling to make
them.144 Thus, it is the interpretive regime and the informal adjustment mechanisms that it
fosters, and not the arbitral body, which does the contextualizing.

2. High Uncertainty and the Problem of Joint Risk Mitigation145
Consider next the setting of high uncertainty and thick markets. This domain has not
been as prominent in the study of contracts as the preceding one, but for reasons we have
discussed elsewhere it is rapidly increasing as a matter of practical concern.146 The problem here
is not the a generalist court’s ignorance of established understanding or practices, as in the low
uncertainty case. Under conditions of high uncertainty both generalists and insiders are unsure
about what the solution might be. The aim of this interpretive regime is therefore not the
elaboration and codification of established knowledge to which a generalist court does not have
access, but rather the organization of collective exploration of possibilities for problem solving,
especially the mitigation of risks that can only be addressed through exacting, common efforts by
all market participants. Here, as in the case of bi-lateral collaborative contracting, the role of the
generalist court in interpretation is limited to policing opportunistic efforts to evade the
collective commitment.
Food safety illustrates the class of risk that motivate the formation of this type of
collective contractual design. As the supply chains for foodstuffs lengthen and ramify,
pathogens can enter in innumerable and rapidly changing ways that are very difficult to trace.
Undetected, food contamination is rapidly propagated by processing (through mixing of
foodstuffs and secondary contamination of equipment), and then disseminated through extensive
distribution networks. Since the failure of any actor to scrupulously adhere to the good practices
can undo the efforts of all the others, adhesion to the requirements of the regime will be a
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precondition to contracting in the market.
The California Leafy Greens Products Handler Marketing Agreement is an exemplar of a
collective regime of this type.147 Leafy greens became a salient concern after highly publicized
disease outbreaks from tainted spinach and lettuce in 2006. Leafy greens pose particular risks
because they are often eaten raw (cooking kills most micro pathogens) and because these
vegetables, produced in larger scale operations than in the past, are often sold in “salad mixes”
that mingle pieces picked in different locations, thus multiplying the possibilities for cross
contamination. Federal food regulation has focused traditionally on post-farm industrial
processing where there is less uncertainty concerning the source of contamination, and was ill
pre-prepared to address the numerous “critical control points” on the farm by which pathogens
could enter this food chain.
The LGMA designates safety standards or “best practices” for the farms from which the
handlers buy. These standards require growers and processors to prepare plans identifying
hazardous control points, detailing the measures undertaken to mitigate the risk, and reporting
the results of tests verifying the efficacy of these measures. The LGMA additionally requires
each handler to maintain records that permit identification of the farm and field from which all
components of its products originate should contamination later be discovered. The members
commit to deal only with farms that comply with the standards. As in the case of the lowuncertainty regimes discussed above, the ultimate sanction for noncompliance is suspension or
withdrawal of a recalcitrant member’s right to use a service mark, and thus temporary or
permanent exclusion from the industry.148
As in our previous examples, the success of the LGMA and the durability of the
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collective collaboration among industry participants demonstrates how relatively unsophisticated
commercial parties, such as the growers of leafy greens, can take advantage of economies of
scale to design a legally sophisticated interpretive regime: this regime assigns to the industry
group the responsibility for establishing the baseline of standards of behavior and processes, and
assigns to courts the more limited role of identifying significant deviations from that baseline in
particular cases.149
3. High Uncertainty with Moderate Scale: The Delaware Court of Chancery
Consider now the setting where there are a large number of highly complex transactions
that share general features, but where each transaction has significant idiosyncrasies, and the
common background conditions shift rapidly. This is the setting in which, for example, the legal
rules governing the obligations of boards of directors in corporate acquisitions are applied. The
uncertainty arises not from the unforeseeable, unintended consequences of incorporation of new
actors, products and production processes into a highly interdependent, if not joint endeavor, as
in maintaining the safety of a food supply chain. Rather the uncertainty arises through the
strategic interaction of corporate actors intent on manipulating open-ended rules in volatile
environments to advance their private interests. On the one hand, the parties both know the
general rules that apply, but also know that the other will seek to exploit those rules to its
advantage. To the extent that actors in such environment take collective actions to reduce the
very uncertainty to which they contribute, with the complementary aim of reducing the chance of
judicial error in ex post application of standards like fiduciary duty, they will need to rely on
expert judges with significant experience in the field: to rely, that is, on a specialized court of
equity. The specialization of the court and its equitable powers assure parties that, despite the
impossibility of codifying decision rules, judicial decisions will be taken with the fullest possible
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awareness of current understandings of good practice, that is, the court can with reasonable
accuracy assess the context because it is part of it. Thus, the Chancery Court applies a
standard—fiduciary duty—to assess the parties’ behavior. The special advantage of the
Chancery Court, as we saw in Part III.B.1, is that a court’s experience and expertise expands the
range of uncertainty over which a standard effectively trades off between ex ante contracting
costs and ex post enforcement costs.150
One way to understand why a majority of U.S. public corporations choose Delaware as
an incorporation state is that it serves to allocate to the Delaware Court of Chancery jurisdiction
to resolve fiduciary duty issues. Delaware corporate law is enabling, that is, it gives corporations
wide latitude to adopt specific rules governing their behavior; organization design is left to the
parties just as is contract design in a textualist interpretive regime. In fact, Delaware
corporations appear not to accept that invitation, writing articles of incorporation and bylaws that
largely address formal issues like meeting dates, because a corporation’s circumstances and the
evolution of the market for corporate control are too uncertain to specify ex ante conduct rules
that will govern all of the corporation’s activities in the future.151 So all ex ante rules governing
formal issues are subject to ex post court review of the context because the parties can be
expected to manipulate those rules to their advantage when circumstances make it to their
advantage to do so. Formal compliance with ex ante rules thus remains subject to ex post court
review through a standard—the director and officer’s overriding obligation of fiduciary duty.152
Like contracting parties operating under uncertainty, a corporation assures that as circumstances
reveal ex post gaps in its articles of incorporation and bylaws as a result of uncertainty, they will
be filled by a standard applied by a court with the expertise to reduce the likelihood of error.
This is accomplished by incorporating in a jurisdiction that has sufficient scale of incorporations
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that its judges develop the necessary experience and expertise.153 In this respect a modern court
of equity resembles the early English courts of equity—the Chancery Court has deep knowledge
of the community whose disputes it resolves, as did the early courts of equity with respect to the
homogenous economy in which its litigants operated.
Both the cost and benefit of delegating to a court or other arbiter the task of assessing
context ex post goes up with uncertainty; but the shape of the curve in Figure 1154 is based on the
expectation that increased uncertainty more than proportionately increases the cost of the
decision to delegate discretion to courts as the uncertainty erodes natural constraints on judicial
misuse of context and the incentive for moral hazard-based litigation. However, increasing the
quality of the adjudicator can increase benefit relative to cost and thus shift the shape of the
relationship between uncertainty and resort to context. In short, an expert court extends the
range of uncertainty over which a standard-like fiduciary duty can operate effectively.
It is at this point that a collective decision to choose the same forum has an ironic impact:
it allows the parties, by choosing the adjudicator, actually to reincarnate Llewellyn’s concept of
the merchant jury, the very judicial sensorium that had been eliminated from the U.C.C. To add
irony to irony, the only judicially based interpretative regime that fully reflects Llewellyn’s
vision is not found in contract law, but in Delaware corporate law where, coming full circle, the
central player is a court of equity.

IV. TEXT AND CONTEXT IN TRANSACTIONS WITH LEGALLY UNSOPHISTICATED PARTIES
At the outset, we sharply distinguished between the application of doctrinal rules of
contract interpretation to the contracts of legally sophisticated and legally unsophisticated
parties.155 With respect to the interpretation of legally sophisticated commercial contracts, we
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have argued that, properly understood, textualist interpretation does not prohibit resort to context
by generalist courts in interpreting commercial contracts. Rather, textualist interpretation
empowers contract design—the parties design interpretive regimes to prescribe the mixture of
text and context that reflects the level of uncertainty and scale presented by their transaction.
But legally unsophisticated parties by definition do not design contracts. Consumers, for
example, play no role in the design of the contracts covering their transactions, and the parties
who do design them may have exploitation of consumers as one of their goals. As we have seen,
in important respects a central justification of a mandatory contextual interpretive regime is
precisely to shift the contract design function from a legally unsophisticated individual to a
generalist court, just the opposite of the appropriate interpretive regime for sophisticated
commercial contracts.
Yet the application of a contextualist interpretive regime to consumer transactions makes
the same mistake for these transactions as it did for legally sophisticated commercial contracts: it
assigns the design function and hence the choice of the best mix of text and context, to the wrong
party. To be sure, a generalist court is better than empowering an exploitive contract designer,
but we argue in this Part that a simple assignment of the contract design function in consumer
transactions to a generalist court is also wrong. We show in Part IV.A that generalist courts
standing alone are the least successful of the menu of public institutions that are capable of
designing a interpretive regime to protect the rights of the consumer.
Consumers, however, are not the only parties who do not participate meaningfully in the
design of their contracts. Neither do legally unsophisticated businesspersons—the archetypical
vulnerable party, central to Llewellyn’s thinking about contract interpretation, whom we
consider in Part IV.B. Like the consumer, these parties also do not carefully design their
contracts, even if in a rote way they do choose the documents. In this setting, the application of a
contextualist interpretive regime as a default rule, with an expert court acting to determine the
context and to devise a complementary understanding of the parties’ relationship, offers the
promise of an effective interpretive regime. Unhappily, however, the available evidence
suggests that assigning that task by default to generalist court, as the law currently does,
59

measurably increases the risk of judicial error.
A. An Interpretive Regime for Adhesion Contracts
Here we propose separating consumer contracts from the standard common law rules of
interpretation designed for commercial parties by first acknowledging that commercial and
consumer contracts are different and should be interpreted differently. We then relieve generalist
courts of the burden of undertaking an unsupported empirical inquiry into context in connection
with consumer contracts. We argue that it is a category mistake to treat the problem of
exploitation in adhesion contracts156 as a question of contract interpretation. The assumption that
only a pure contextualist approach can protect the weak against the powerful—as Justice Traynor
famously argued157—underlies the deep resistance of many scholars to the argument that
sophisticated parties should be permitted to choose for themselves the answers to the questions
of who decides when and to the extent that context is considered. But despite calls for common
law contract rules that equip generalist courts with the tools to police consumer transactions, no
such development has occurred.158 One reason, surely, is that courts are peculiarly ill equipped
to the task. We argue, therefore, for a interpretive regime that can draw lines between those
transactions in which parties are free to choose their interpretive styles and those where
mandatory regulation of terms is required to insure fair treatment.
The emerging interpretive regime in the EU offers many of the elements of a template for
crafting a contract design process that separates agreements deserving special scrutiny from
contracts between legally sophisticated parties. To safeguard consumers and to assure the legal
certainty on which commerce depends, the EU has chosen to separate contracts with consumers
from the larger body of general contract law and to regulate consumer contracts through several
156
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directives harmonizing standards of consumer protection. The aim is to establish rules of
commercial good conduct in settings in which consumers may be especially vulnerable to
exploitation; to ban contract terms that serve only the interests of one party to the transaction;
and to do this without affecting the contract law that generally governs agreements between
commercial parties.
1. The European Consumer Rights Directive and the Role of the Courts
Within the EU single market, the fundamental problem of balancing protection of the
contracting parties’ freedom to arrange their own affairs and protection of the weaker party
against imposition of lopsided bargains is exacerbated by interpretive diversity: the fact that
private law relations “are to a significant extent still governed by national law,” with the
consequence that “the same type of [contractual] terms may even have different legal effects in
different national legal systems.”159 Hence protections valid in one member state may be
unrecognized in another, to the detriment of the consumer and to the common market to which
the EU is dedicated. Consumer protection thus has been an abiding concern in the EU: “There
has been no other area in contract law which has been subject to so much EU legislative
influence.”160 This has been addressed by crafting EU directives that address consumer contracts
and so trump member state law.
A central element of the EU’s consumer contract interpretive regime is the Directive on
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts.161 It aims to “facilitate the establishment of the internal
market [and] also to ensure protection for individuals in their capacity as consumers when they
purchase goods or services under a contract.”162 An Annex to the Directive contains a nonexhaustive, indicative, “gray” list of seventeen potentially unfair contract terms.163 In order to
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capture behavior beyond that which is specifically proscribed, a general clause in Art. 3(1)
defines as unfair any contractual term, not individually negotiated, that “contrary to the
requirement of good faith . . . causes a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations
arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.”164 Similarly the Unfair
Commercial Practices Directive includes an Annex listing “commercial practices which are in all
circumstances considered unfair” to the consumer.165 The Doorstep Selling Directive, is another
prominent example, addressing the element of surprise in contracts concluded away from the
business premises of the trader, under circumstances where the consumer, not contemplating a
purchase, may be caught off guard.166 To mitigate the effect of sharp practices it ensures that the
consumer has, and is properly notified of, a fourteen-day “cooling-off period,” beginning with
receipt of the notice, during which she has a right of withdrawal from the contract.167
Under EU law, responsibility for determining the unfairness of terms in particular
consumer contracts falls primarily to the courts of member states, which can make use of the
preliminary reference procedure to pose questions concerning the interpretation of EU law to the
Court of Justice of the European Union.168 For its part, the Court of Justice has generated a
consumer or personal injury to the latter resulting from an act or omission of that seller or
supplier;
(b) inappropriately excluding or limiting the legal rights of the consumer vis-à-vis the seller or
supplier or another party in the event of total or partial non-performance or inadequate
performance by the seller or supplier of any of the contractual obligations, including the option of
offsetting a debt owed to the seller or supplier against any claim which the consumer may have
against him;
(c) making an agreement binding on the consumer whereas provision of services by the seller or
supplier is subject to a condition whose realization depends on his own will alone;
(d) permitting the seller or supplier to retain sums paid by the consumer where the latter decides
not to conclude or perform the contract, without providing for the consumer to receive
compensation of an equivalent amount from the seller or supplier where the latter is the party
cancelling the contract;
(e) requiring any consumer who fails to fulfill his obligation to pay a disproportionately high sum
in compensation.
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substantial body of case law in its efforts to reduce ambiguities arising from the unintended
effects of the directives themselves.169 Here, updating is required to protect the legitimate
interests of sellers. For example, permitting debtors to escape obligations that they assumed
under impermissible conditions may create a moral hazard risk where debtors are able to escape
legitimately incurred debts. Continuing evaluation of the secondary effects of the directives is
needed to assure that they do not inadvertently create the very asymmetries in contractual
relations they are designed to mitigate. Thus, the Court has qualified statutory remedies to
prevent opportunistic consumers from benefiting to the detriment of either other consumers170 or
the trader.171 Where the Court in the procedure-related cases based its intervention on the text of
the Directive, here it justified its insistence on balance or symmetry in the treatment of the
parties on “general principles of civil law.”172
These efforts notwithstanding there are still important gaps in the EU regime for
consumer contracts. The most significant is the absence of a comprehensive and reliable
mechanism for updating the lists of prohibited contract terms provided in various directives. In
part national courts can keep abreast of relevant changes in commercial practice simply by
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mutual monitoring of precedential decisions. But without a mechanism for more systematic,
continuing review and updating there is the risk both that practices threatening consumer
interests diffuse and take hold before they are clearly condemned, and that commerce is
burdened by the enforcement of restrictions that have lost their relevance to consumer
protection.173
In sum, under the current regime the national courts of the member states play a quasiadministrative function—drawing the attention of home-state regulators to possibly unfair terms.
In turn, the Court of Justice acts as a judicial backstop, correcting procedural limitations and
unintended consequences of the protective framework. The overall effect is to protect
consumers, and by extension other vulnerable parties, obligating member states to do a “spring
cleaning”174 of their consumer-protection regimes to ensure conformity with the developing
principles of EU law, yet (by reserving application of those principles to national courts) not
unduly unsettling the surrounding body of national contract doctrine.175 Such an interpretive
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regime differs from conventional adjudication in treating each case not only as a matter of
fairness to an individual claimant, but as a potential indication of systemic failure and an
opportunity for improvement that applies broadly to all consumers in the particular market. By
establishing a similar quasi-administrative regime through appropriate state or federal legislation,
American contract law could accomplish two critically important goals: first, to more effectively
and appropriately regulate non-negotiated consumer transactions; and, second, to free
sophisticated commercial parties from constraints that are inapt to their circumstances.
2. A Common Law Adaptation of the European Model
Consumer-oriented interpretive regimes of this sort also can be found in U.S. law.
Insurance law is a long-standing example, which also exhibits flaws and failures over its history.
After a long period in which generalist judges modified common law doctrines to create, in
effect, a special contract law for insurance, courts, responded to the broad revival of textualist
interpretation in recent decades by undermining the very doctrinal structure they had created.
But this failure does not seem to reflect any limit of the common law; rather, as in the case of EU
consumer rights, it points to the need for a stabilizing conception of the relation between
generalist courts and the interpretive regime.
The provision of insurance is highly regulated by the states to balance the need to
safeguard the solvency of insurers with the requirement of broad accessibility of coverage to
consumers on fair terms. To assure adequate risk pooling and reduce the effects of adverse
selection, coverage of certain types of insurance is mandatory. Thus, all states have compulsory
automobile liability insurance in some form. To ensure actuarial precision, moreover, terms
specifying the conditions of coverage have to be standardized by statute or regulation across the
risk pool, so consumers desiring a particular type of coverage must accept the terms of the
industry standard. The 1943 New York Standard Fire Insurance Policy, for example, is used in
nearly every state and incorporated into the standard homeowner’s policy. To underscore the
extreme limitations on consumer choice in this domain, agreements between insurers and insured
have been called “super-adhesion” contracts.

CODE: THE WAY FORWARD 182-209 (2008).
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In view of pervasive regulation and standardization of insurance, and the resulting
restrictions on the consumer’s capacity to bargain over terms, courts from roughly the 1960s
through the end of the 1980s modified general rules of contract to reach decisions protecting
consumer interests while also creating incentives for insurers and regulators to clarify and
strengthen the overall regime.176 One of the most important adjustments of general doctrine was
the elaboration of a strong variant of contra proferentem, under which a court encountering an
ambiguity in an agreement immediately decides for the policyholder rather than undertaking the
usual efforts to determine the parties’ meaning.177 Another was judicial defense of the
policyholder’s reasonable expectations of coverage, explicit language in the agreement
notwithstanding. As Professor Robert Keeton summarized the doctrine over forty years ago:
“The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the
terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking study of the policy
provisions would have negated those expectations.”178 Had courts applied these doctrines with
consistent rigor, and had insurers and regulators responded in kind by updating policy forms in
response to the continuing dialogue with courts, the result would likely have been an ongoing
clarification and updating of what counts as an unambiguous policy term, and what expectations
of insurance coverage policyholders may reasonably have.179
Unhappily, the courts’ inconsistent protection of reasonable expectations and their
embrace of interpretive rules drawn from common law contract principles undercut both that
doctrine and the strong form of contra proferentem. Moreover, the courts fitful oversight of
regulators—despite clear authority to hold them to account—and, most generally, their lack of
understanding of the judiciary’s role in the emergent constellation of insurance law, contributed
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significantly, perhaps decisively to the disorganization of what had been an emergent special
purpose interpretive regime.
This pattern can be seen in the trajectory of the application of reasonable expectations
doctrine to insurance contracts. The appeal, but also the limit of reasonable expectations as a
stand-alone special purpose insurance contract doctrine was its generality. The doctrine, a
creature of the common law, can be applied beyond insurance 180 to the vast majority of adhesion
contracts to which consumer consent in mass-market settings. Indeed, at least one state has
already extended the reasonable expectations doctrine broadly to reach all standard form
consumer contracts,181 and scholars have generally conceded that there “is no principled
justification for it being limited to insurance policies.”182 But as the doctrine became untethered
from its original setting in insurance, and as that setting itself changed in ways that generalist
judges could not themselves directly register, the attractive indeterminacy of the reasonable
expectations model in the setting of an ongoing dialogue between courts and regulators led to
unpredictable decisions (“the opinions speak of expectations without satisfactorily pointing to
their source”183) and judicial error—the costs of which have arguably been borne by consumers
in the former of higher premiums.184 Thus, many courts have been reluctant to apply the
doctrine except in cases of egregious abuse, and when it is applied it has been the subject of
sustained scholarly criticism.185
Generalist courts have consequently abandoned the understanding of reasonable
expectations as a mandate to evaluate the conformity of an agreement to the larger goals of
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insurance policy regardless of the clarity of the contractual language; instead they apply the
doctrine to resolve residual ambiguity. As the Supreme Court of West Virginia recently put it:
'[i]n West Virginia, the doctrine of reasonable expectations is limited to those instances . . . in
which the policy language is ambiguous.' This Court has explained that ‘[t]he doctrine of
reasonable expectations is essentially a rule of construction, and unambiguous contracts do not
require construction by the courts.

With regard to contra preferentem, generalist courts have reverted in insurance cases to
traditional, general contracts doctrine. This turns the doctrine (back) into a rule of last resort, to
be applied against the drafter only after the usual interpretive means of ascertaining the parties’
intent have failed. The upshot is that the insurance-law regime adumbrated by Professor Keeton
is in disarray.
This outcome might have been avoided if courts, instead of re-imposing general contract
doctrines, had instead used their power of administrative review to induce regulators to seek
clarification of insurance terms and policies. In that case the doctrinal adjustments would have
functioned as a judicially administered incentive system—rewarding clarity achieved by the
parties under the regulator’s aegis, and penalizing failure to achieve this result—rather than an as
open-ended invitation to judges themselves to determine in particular cases what the parties
ought to have intended. For instance, some codes obligate the insurance commissioner to
disallow a policy form containing or incorporating by reference ambiguous or misleading
clauses; similar statutes mandate disapproval of a form whose provisions are unfair, inequitable,
or contrary to the state's public policy. Instead of entering into this dialogue with regulators,
generalist courts preferred to defer to the pro forma decisions of regulators, and treat their assent
to forms and policies as an expression of legislative will, binding the judiciary and the parties to
eventual contracts.186
It may be possible to apply the lessons of the EU example and the rise and decline of the
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insurance contract law regime to the construction of a consumer contract regime in the U.S. even
in the absence of encompassing legislation to that effect. For example, considerable authority to
regulate terms in consumer contracts is currently embodied in legislation creating the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau as well as in the authority of the Federal Trade Commission to
regulate “unfair trade practices.”187 As the preceding discussion suggests, the baseline
establishing the expectations that are “reasonable” in any given market cannot come from
generalist courts. The information needed to answer this question can, however, be developed
through the rule making process of administrative agencies charged with the task of regulating
transactions in particular markets and sharpened though interaction with the courts, both in
judicial review of them and in their application.
A particularly salient example of just such a process is the recent action by the Consumer
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Financial Protection Bureau in issuing a model “plain language” form for credit card contracts.188
Importantly, use of the model form is not mandatory for banks and other entities that extend
credit to consumers. Rather, the use of a model form provides a safe harbor for creditors or
lessors.189 Thus, it is conceived as a default from which the regulated entities may depart at their
option. The objective, then, is not to impose the terms and conditions of credit card contracts but
rather to provide a baseline of “reasonable expectations” against which existing practices can be
measured. This is the empirical question that courts have been unable to answer successfully in
the insurance context. What a generalist court can do better, however, is to assess the facts in
individual disputes and measure the distance between the baseline and the contractual terms and
conditions in the disputed contract. By engaging in this more limited role, over time a
jurisprudence of legally significant deviations from the baseline will emerge. That experience, in
turn, would provide the updating mechanism that permits the relevant agency to revise the
baseline in light of the new information revealed in litigation. In this way, the underlying
empirical realities can be revised to better balance the interests of both the merchant seller and
the class of consumers in the particular market being regulated.190
The model credit card standard form is not an isolated example of how a consumer
contract regime can emerge. The use of model terms and conditions as baselines for litigation
under the doctrine of reasonable expectations is a interpretive strategy that easily can be adopted
188
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by other interpretive bodies, in particular the Federal Trade Commission, that deploy their rulemaking authority to develop the empirical foundation of the standards for fair contracting in
other markets with similar characteristics.191
B. Design Choices and Interpretive Regimes for Legally Unsophisticated Commercial
Parties
We now consider a different group of contracting parties who, like consumers, have been
said to be especially in need of assistance by generalist courts through contextualist
interpretation, but for starkly different reasons. This is the world of small business, whose
participants were of special concern to Karl Llewellyn. These parties are sophisticated with
respect to their businesses; however, they choose legally unsophisticated contractual
arrangements. The amount of money at stake in a single transaction typically is too small to
warrant bespoke contracting to create an interpretive regime that a textualist court should respect.
Nor are dealings homogeneous enough to motivate creation of a detailed industry code and
dispute resolution system. Hence these parties are drawn to standardized and prefabricated
contracting documents, such as invoices, purchase orders and acknowledgment forms. This is
the realm, for example, of the dueling forms problem: where one party’s invitation to a
counterparty to enter a transaction is reflected in one form with attendant boilerplate, while the
counterparty agrees to participate through transmittal of a different form whose attendant
boilerplate differs from the first form in a fashion that turns out to be significant ex post.192 In
this realm, moreover, as Llewellyn stressed and Stewart Macaulay later corroborated,193
relationships are often long standing and depend importantly on custom, practice and past course
of dealings.194 Under these conditions it is for generalist courts to determine applicable
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standards in resolving disputes.
We consider first the more common case in which legally unsophisticated commercial
contracting parties are poorly served by standardized contracts inviting contextualization by
generalist courts because, lacking the requisite specialization, such courts will be relatively
ineffective at deriving context through the limited sources of information available in litigation.
The result is a higher incidence of mistakes, increasing the attraction of informal resolutions
compared to formal resolution. From this perspective, small business patterns of relational
contracting described by Macaulay flow not only from the cost of judicial resolution, but also
from its poor performance.
We then turn to the exceptional outcomes in which a particular court will have the
favorable attributes we have ascribed to early courts of equity—a deep knowledge of the local
community and of the businesses that come before it—resulting often from geographical
concentration of industry and therefore cases.195 Such a match between local courts and local
industry provides an effective legal infrastructure for an industrial district;196 in effect, we see a
naturally occurring interpretive or epistemic community. In this circumstance, the generalist
court acquires the expertise to well serve its litigants—in this regard, it becomes a specialist.
Two examples illustrate the range of conditions favoring this exceptional outcome. The
first, introduced above, is the Delaware Chancery Court, a virtual industrial district that allows
geographically dispersed companies to concentrate for purposes of applicable legal rules and
dispute resolution.197 The second is the Santa Clara County Superior Court, which is the
California trial court for much of Silicon Valley. Unlike the Delaware Chancery court, the Santa
performance by the parties is considered the best indication of what they intended the writing to mean.”).
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Clara Superior Court is generalist in terms of jurisdiction but is specialized as a result of
geographic industrial concentration (rather than the virtual concentration observed in Delaware).
In these circumstances, a generalist court is effective because its ongoing dealings with a
particular kind of business may result in specialized expertise.
1. Interpretation of Commercial Contracts without Ex Ante Design: The Costs
of Using Generalist Courts
Legally unsophisticated commercial parties—the paradigmatic sales transactions formed
by the exchange of standard form documents and highlighted by the potential for conflicts
between the (dueling) forms—are the primary focus of concern in this section. A textualist
emphasis on the use of merger clauses and plain meaning interpretation, instead of empowering
these parties to actively design their contract, may force them into an unwanted textualist regime
from which they can opt out only at great cost: the individual transactions can be expected to be
too small and to move too quickly to make costly bespoke contracting feasible. The problem is
not that the parties are unsophisticated about the subject of their contracting. Rather, these
contracts reflect typically short-term interactions. Circumstances change between each iteration,
and a bespoke contract that seeks to address anticipated but not predictable changes in
specifications, quantity and price is well beyond the parties’ capacities to craft without an
investment that is not feasible given the size of the contract. A bespoke contract that speaks to
only a single transaction would have to be adjusted, at daunting drafting costs, to then current
circumstances with each iteration lest in a textualist regime the court will apply terms that no
longer fit. Moreover, the costs of such adjustment are also high with respect to the time involved
to negotiate and renegotiate the contract. As Patrick Bolton has shown, the cost of delay when
commercial circumstances make speed important raises the price of the reduced uncertainty
associated with ex ante contract design.198
As we have seen, the cost of updating to reflect changing conditions is not burdensome
when the scale of the type of contracting supports the development of a interpretive regime that
198
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collectivizes both the updating of contract terms and their interpretation. The problem in this
category of legally unsophisticated commercial contracting, however, is that the number of
parties, their relatively small size, and the idiosyncrasies of their dealings makes the
development of an interpretive community of the sort we have examined elsewhere, such as the
cotton market, infeasible.199
But courts applying contextual interpretation to these legally unsophisticated parties in
areas of geographic concentration of similar contracting parties can develop both judicial
expertise in the subject matter and a body of precedents that can parallel private interpretive
regimes.200 In effect, in instances such as the Delaware Court of Chancery and perhaps the San
Jose Superior Court with respect to the Silicon Valley industrial district we see a type of
interpretive regime developing in a form that reflects both the constraints imposed by the
problems of uncertainty and scale that prevent recourse to either bespoke contracting or a
collective interpretive regime, and the potential that generalist courts may become specialist
courts through repeated exposure to the particular industry. It is the potential for this form of
naturally occurring judicially based interpretive regime that may have underlain Llewellyn’s
willingness to accept the Uniform Commercial Code’s mandatory contextual interpretation
despite the rejection of the merchant jury. Under these circumstances, a generalist court
applying contextualist interpretation can well serve a geographic concentration of similar
contracting parties—the judicial element of a Marshallian industrial district.
But what is the fate of legally unsophisticated parties who lack the scale to create private
interpretive regimes and where the levels of commercial concentration cannot produce judicial
expertise and specialization? Here the trigger to textualist interpretation (a merger or integration
199
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clause or a facially complete contract) is unlikely to be present in many cases, and so these
parties remain subject to the default contextualist interpretive style. Absent the kind of
concentration that allows a generalist court to build knowledge and expertise, and given the lack
of scale and the barriers of cost, generalist courts will be the only formal—but ineffective—
method of dispute resolution, but the risk of mistake resulting from lack of specialized
experience will push the parties toward informal methods. In those circumstances, where
general courts applying contextual interpretation will perform least well, we would expect they
would be resorted to less frequently.201
The heightened risk of error by a generalist court seeking the relevant contractual context
is a function of two core problems. The first is the growing evidence that, even in a stable world,
custom and practice do not tend towards the kind of equillibria that can be captured in a rule, and
that in a world of uncertainty even such jittery constancy as exists in commercial practice in
quiet environments is constantly changing in response to exogenous and endogenous factors.202
In short, there may not be any stable custom or usage for the court to find as a fact as the legal
doctrine currently assumes can be done.203 While intimate familiarity with the evolving
commercial practice may permit an expert court, such as the Delaware Court of Chancery, to
reliably recover the always-evolving contextual facts needed to resolve fiduciary duty disputes,
generalist courts are denied access to such specialized knowledge. Second, and perhaps for the
foregoing reasons, there is growing evidence that generalist courts do not to even try to find the
relevant custom and usages. This evidence suggests that many courts, lacking expertise, rely on
interested party testimony and unsupported assumptions of reasonable commercial behavior
rather than a careful evaluation of complex evidentiary submissions.204
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There is some modest evidence that generalist courts are beginning to shape legal
doctrine in response to the heightened risk of error in unfocused explorations of context. For
example, under New York law a court is permitted under limited circumstances to allow use of
context evidence to show that language that appears to have a plain meaning in fact has a
different trade usage, even where the trigger to textualism is otherwise met.205 But here, the
courts limit the breadth of any ex post resort to context. To defeat the grant of summary
judgment in favor of a party relying on the plain meaning of contractual terms, the court in effect
requires the equivalent of trade association specifications. The party urging that terms have a
specialized industry meaning must meet a very high standard to avoid summary judgment:
“[P]roof of custom and usage consists of proof that the language in question is ‘fixed and
invariable’ in the industry in question.”206 The trade usage must be “‘so well settled, so
uniformly acted upon, and so long continued as to raise a fair presumption that it was known to
both parties and that they contracted in reference thereto.’”207 Four our purposes, note the safety
valve that releases contextualist interpretation explicitly looks to the central characteristic of an
industrial district: scale, with the actions of many small contracting parties giving rise to the clear
patterns of meaning that Llewellyn had in mind.208
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In sum, smaller parties who sensibly, albeit sometimes intuitively rather than analytically,
reject an invitation to engage in contract design likely will confront courts considering context ex
post, a form of interpretive regime that fits the parties’ contracting conditions. For these parties,
the resulting increase in back-end enforcement costs is preferable to the alternative of incurring
the even larger increase in the front-end costs of ex ante design. And in those circumstances
where courts do not have the specialized local knowledge of the early courts of equity, we can
expect the parties to minimize the role of inexperienced generalist courts by relying more heavily
on relationally based enforcement.

2. The Return of Equity: Expert Courts as Interpretive Regimes
While LLCs and other organizational forms like limited partnerships are used by legally
sophisticated parties as both the basis for large private equity and venture capital funds and in
some cases as a vehicle for public investment, 209 a very large number of privately held
businesses whose participants are legally unsophisticated contract with each other over the terms
of their organizational relationship through the corporation’s articles of incorporation or, for
LLCs, through the operating agreement.210 As we will see, judicial specialization appropriately
that do misuse standard from documents, we believe that contextualist interpretation by a generalist court absent
geographical concentration of the particular form of contract and industry, is likely to yield even worse results. In
this setting, the court confronts what is basically a standard form contract. The generalist court has no guidance
concerning what context is relevant other than the parties’ instrumental assertions at the time of litigation. Thus, the
likelihood of moral hazard inducing error is high. As a result, contracting parties will have an incentive to develop
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addresses the interpretive problem associated with the contract design that establishes an
organization.
Situating the relationship of the corporate law of small privately held corporations within
contending interpretive approaches in contract law requires a little history. The attraction of
corporate organization to small business people is that the corporate form typically will shield
shareholder-owners from personal liability for the debts of the corporation whether in tort or
contract. But what governs the relations among the participants in the corporation? Typically,
the “form” contract was reflected in the corporation’s articles of incorporations and bylaws, and
sometimes in a shareholders’ agreement. As with smaller commercial parties contracting among
themselves directly, these owners often did not address the range of state contingencies that
might leave some of the owners subject to opportunistic behavior as facts replaced expectations
with the passage of time.211 A standard pattern was that a controlling and a minority owner
would extract the return on their investment through their employment by the corporation.
Subsequently, the controlling shareholder used standard corporate law rules to terminate the
employment of the minority owner and so drastically reduced the value of the minority stake.212
In general, courts responded to these smaller scale intra-corporate contracting issues
through the application of a broad standard and the resulting contextual interpretation. This was
accomplished in close corporations by the proposition that shareholders in a close corporation
owed each other a fiduciary duty, whose measure was the shareholders’ “reasonable
expectations” determined through the court’s parsing of the testimony.213 What remained
unclear in this parallel contractual regime is whether the use of a broad standard of contextual
211
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interpretation was a default or, as in the case of the general contextualist position, mandatory.
Recent events in Delaware provide a nice account of this tension. In 1993, Delaware
rejected the position, commonplace in other jurisdictions, that shareholders in a close corporation
owed each other a special fiduciary duty measured by reasonable expectations.214 However,
Delaware also treats general fiduciary duty in corporations, as opposed to a special close
corporation fiduciary duty, as mandatory and not subject to waiver.215 This outcome, however,
does not extend to alternative forms of entities, like limited partnerships and LLCs. A series of
statutes and court decisions resulted in the clear position that Delaware limited partnerships and
LLCs can alter or entirely eliminate fiduciary duty or replace it with such contractual provisions
as they saw fit.216
This left open the critical issue from our perspective: what was the interpretive default
rule—a contextualist fiduciary duty standard or a textualist’s examination of the entity’s
organizational documents? The issue was especially important in Delaware because it was
apparent that Delaware had a mixture of sophisticated and unsophisticated users of LLCs, but
with the majority in the sophisticated category. As of the end of 2010, 550,238 LLCs had been
organized in Delaware, including 82,207 in 2010 alone. The population in Delaware at the close
of 2010 was 897,934.217 Most of the Delaware LLCs therefore were organized on behalf of
people outside of Delaware, the choice of an organization state other than the organizers’ home
state itself being a fair signal of sophistication.
Consistent with our discussion of how a contextually informed court can and should
protect the interests of legally unsophisticated commercial parties, the Delaware Chancery Court
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concluded in Auriga Capital Corporation v. Gatz Properties, LLC218 that fiduciary duty applied
as a default in LLCs unless the entity’s organizational documents modified or eliminated it. This
led to a moderately unseemly exchange between the Chancellor of Delaware and the Chief
Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court. The Chief Justice, in a law review article written before
the Auriga decision, had strongly advocated for a default rule that eliminated fiduciary duty—if
legally unsophisticated parties wanted fiduciary duties, they should have to say so.219 The
Chancellor was not convinced. In a lengthy opinion the Chancellor adopted the contextualist
default rule, leaving it to legally sophisticated parties to opt out through their drafting of the
organizational documents.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion concluded that the
Chancellor’s discussion in Auriga was dicta (an arguable position) and chastised him for
addressing the issue at all: “[I]t was improvident and unnecessary for the trial court to reach out
and decide, sua sponte, the default duty fiduciary issue as a matter of statutory construction.”220
The Supreme Court then went on, itself in (quite pointed) dicta, to set out the Chief Justice’s side
of the argument. The matter finally was resolved in favor of the Chancellor by the Delaware
legislature—the default rule was fiduciary duty.221 Put in our terms: text and context. Legally
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Independent of the merits of the particular controversy, the dispute between the Chancery Court and the Supreme
Court recalls the tension between law and equity recounted in Part II above. The Chancery Court chooses to protect
its recourse to context—the application of its specialized expertise to make a standard viable in the face of
significant uncertainty. The Supreme Court sounds more like a law court. This is not the first time that the
Chancery Court and the Supreme Court have faced off in a fashion that recalls the tension between equity and law,
albeit internal to the Delaware judicial system (the Delaware Chancery Court is explicitly a court of equity; the
Supreme Court, of course, is not). A similar tension has existed between the Chancery Court and the Supreme Court
for 23 years and over the terms of three successive Chancellors over whether the ability of a target board of directors
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COFFEE & GILSON, supra note 213, at 980. The character of the equity versus law tension appears from Chancellor
Chandler’s comment in a case decided just prior to his retirement: “Although I have a hard
time believing that inadequate price alone (according to the target’s board) in the context of a non-discriminatory,
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unsophisticated parties could not take advantage of the Delaware LLC statute’s invitation to elect
a textualist regime—uncertainty and scale made the drafting task infeasible. The result was an
outcome in this contracting context consistent with what we present here: parties are empowered
to design their LLC contract, but smaller entity owners—the corner grocery store as opposed to
the a venture capital fund—are protected by a contextualist default rule that specifies a standard
whose satisfaction is determined by an expert court—the Delaware Court of Chancery.

V. CONCLUSION

The battle over the generalizability of competing contract prototypes has been fueled by
competing ideas of the nature of the decision process that gives rise to a contract and how that
should guide its interpretation. For textualists, the allocation to the parties to decide who
chooses the mix of text and context and when that choice is best made is the expression of intent
of an autonomous agent, who can, with the help of legal counsel, articulate its aims and
anticipate its most advantageous reactions to contingencies. For contextualists, the interpretive
choice always contains an irreducibly social component: Individual intentions, and the associated
expectations of others, are always enmeshed in a web of common understandings and a shared,
practical sense of mutual obligation. It is as impossible as it is unnecessary to articulate them
fully: impossible because the understandings and obligations are tacit and resist explication;
unnecessary because they are widely shared, and so are typically available as guides to action
even when they cannot be fully articulated.
By examining the array of interpretive regimes that occupy the contracting design space
we see the limitations of both conceptions. The textualist understanding of the exercise of ex
ante choice as free standing, articulate and prescient can not make sense of the increasing
intrusion of uncertainty into the familiar world of probabilistic contingencies, and with it the
spread of forms of collaborative contracting: Here sophisticated parties encounter the limits of

all-cash, all-shares, fully financed offer poses any ‘threat’—particularly given the wealth of information available to
Airgas’s stockholders at this point in time—under existing Delaware law, it apparently does. . . . In my personal
view, Airgas’s poison pill has served its legitimate purpose.’’ Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48,
56-57 (Del. Ch. 2011).
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prescience, seeking in collaboration the possibility of gradually articulating intentions, most
directly by joint learning from a context jointly created. Conversely, the manifest inability of
generalist courts in a dynamic society to construe evanescent commercial practices, and the
growing realization that even in steady times customary rules do not emerge spontaneously from
practice exposes the limits of the contextualist understanding of shared norms discovered by ex
post adjudication. Where textualists are driven to explore forms of sociability broadly associated
with contextualism, contextualists are driven to enquire into the design of institutions capable of
articulating, at least partly, tacit understandings, making them more accessible to the kind of
deliberate control broadly associated with textualism. Both must acknowledge dependence, in
many settings on a wide range of interpretive regimes—public and private—that function as
complements to common law adjudication rather than as antagonists.
There is no reason to think that the differences in textualist and contextualist positions
will disappear fully over time, or that a convergence in the concepts of ex ante choice and ex
post adjudication will lead ultimately to a novel synthesis. Nor should this be a cause for regret.
We have no more need for a unified idea of “who decides” than for a unified concept of contract
to respond effectively to the diverse settings in which we transact. But perhaps it is not too much
to expect that careful attention to the wide variety of contracting practices will further weaken
the grip of textualism and contextualism as the master ideas of doctrine and legal imagination,
and help clear the way for more practically supportive appreciation for innovations in contract
design, surprising judicial successes such as the revival of “traditional” courts of equity, and the
role of interpretive regimes, established and emergent, in the resolution of contract disputes.
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